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ENVISIONING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE:
PROGRESSIVE-ERA ECONOMISTS AND THE INTELLECTUAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE U.S. INCOME TAX
Ajay K. Mehrotra*
At the turn of the twentieth century, the U.S. system of public finance
underwent a dramatic, structural transformation. The late nineteenth-century
system of indirect taxes, associated mainly with the tariff, was eclipsed in the
early decades of the twentieth century by a progressive income tax. This shift in
U.S. tax policy marked the emergence of a new fiscal polity-one that was
guided not simply by the functional and structural need for government revenue
but by concerns for equity and economic and social justice. This Article explores
the paradigm shift in legal and economic theories that undergirded this dramatic
shift in U.S. tax policy. More specifically, this Article contends that a particular
group of academic economists played a pivotal role in supplanting the "benefits
theory" of taxation, and its concomitant vision of the state as a passive protector
of private property, with a more equitable principle of taxation based on one's
"ability to pay"--a principle that promoted a more active role for the state in the dis-
tribution of fiscal burdens. In facilitating this structural transformation, these
theorists were able to use the growing concentration of wealth and the ascendancy of
new economic ideas as justifications for using a progressive income tax to reallocate
the burdens of financing the burgeoning American regulatory, administrative, and
welfare state.
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The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right
and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood.
Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe them-
selves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the
slaves of some defunct economist.
-John Maynard Keynes
INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the twentieth century, the U.S. system of public finance
underwent a dramatic, structural transformation. The late nineteenth-century
system of indirect national taxes, associated mainly with the tariff and
regressive excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco, was eclipsed in the early
decades of the twentieth century by a graduated federal income tax that soon
accounted for more than half of all federal tax revenues.' A similar, albeit less
pronounced, shift occurred at the state and local level where the income tax
soon came to challenge the dominant reliance on property taxes.2 This shift
1. 2 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COM., HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 1106-08 (1975), available at http://www2.census.gov/
prod2/statcomp/documents/CT1970pl-01.pdf [hereinafter HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE U.S.]; U.S.
TREASURY DEP'T, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE STATE
oF FINANCES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1971, app. at 12 (1971). In 1880, 90 percent of
federal government revenues came from the combination of customs duties (56 percent) and internal
excise taxes (34 percent). HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE U.S., supra, at 1106-08. By 1930, income
taxes accounted for approximately 59 percent of all federal government receipts. Id. at 1106-07.
2. At the state and local level, the income tax initially supplied only a small portion of
government revenues. But over time, the income tax enabled state and local governments to rely
less on the property tax. In 1890, nearly 80 percent of state and local government receipts were derived
from the property tax, and by 1932 that figure had dropped to about 60 percent. 6 U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COM., 1967 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, No. 5, at 17 (1967).
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in U.S. tax policy toward the direct and progressive taxation of income
marked the emergence of a new fiscal polity--one that was guided not
simply by the functional and structural need for government revenue, but
by concerns for equity and economic and social justice.
Although the early versions of the national and state-level income tax
laws-with their high exemption levels and moderate rates--raised only a
small percentage of total government revenues and affected a relatively small
group of wealthy citizens,4 these early income tax laws were the thin edge of
the wedge.' Not only did exemption levels and rates change dramatically
over the course of the twentieth century, but the revenues generated by the
income tax soon became the lifeblood of the bourgeoning American
regulatory, administrative, and welfare state. Indeed, by the end of the
twentieth century, the progressive income tax had become the central
foundation of modem American public finance, generating in fiscal year
2000 nearly 55 percent of federal receipts, and on average about 40 percent of
state-level tax revenue.6 While national emergencies-in the form of world
wars and the Great Depression-hastened subsequent tax reforms that
3. The 1913 federal income tax, which initiated the permanent national taxation of income,
had a high exemption level of $3000 for single persons ($4000 for married couples), and began with a
"normal" tax of only 1 percent that was graduated to a top "surtax" rate of 6 percent for incomes over
$500,000. This law also contained a flat 1 percent tax on corporate net income. Tariff of 1913, ch.
16, § 2, 33 Star. 114, 166, 169. Similarly, the Wisconsin income tax of 1911, which began the effective
state taxation of income, had high exemption levels and low statutory rates. The Wisconsin tax was
set at a graduated rate that ranged from 1 percent on the first $1000 above the exemption level of
$800 for single taxpayers ($1200 for married couples) to a maximum rate of 6 percent on all taxable
income in excess of$12,000. 1911 Wis. Laws 658.
Though the progressive rates of the 1913 federal income tax may appear moderate by twenty-
first-century standards, at the time, this rate of progression was deemed by many to be a form of government
confiscation. See Ani-uealh Policy, NY. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1913, reprinted in 6 JOHN D. BUENKER, THE
INCOME TAX AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 372-74 (1985).
4. Scholars have estimated that "only about 2% of American households paid" the income
tax during its first few years of existence. W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA:
A SHORT HISTORY 46 (1996); JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 78 (1985).
5. As the legal historian Lawrence Friedman has explained, "The income tax was the
opening wedge for a major transformation of American society." LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 567 (1985).
6. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2002, at 314 tbl.464 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/
statistical-abstract-04.html; STATE PROFILES: THE POPULATION AND ECONOMY OF EACH U.S.
STATE 169 tbl. IL-17 (Helmut F. Wendel et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002). During the late 1950s, the
national income tax accounted for approximately 70 percent of federal government receipts,
suggesting that the American historian George Mowry was correct to claim as early as the 1950s that
"[tihe modem democratic social service state.. probably rests more upon the income tax than upon
any other single legislative act." GEORGE E. MOWRY, THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 263
(1958); HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE U.S., supra note 1, at 1105.
52 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1793 (2005)
crystallized the new fiscal order, it was the turn-of-the-century
transformation that established the intellectual and institutional founda-
tions of the modern American fiscal state.
The structural transformation in American public finance, wrought by
the rising prominence of the income tax, raises several fundamental questions
about the making of tax policy at the turn of the twentieth century. How
and why, for example, was this radical shift in Ameican public finance
possible? \What were the historical factors that affected, and were affected by,
this dramatic change in fiscal policy? And, perhaps most importantly, what
role did the emergence of this new fiscal order play in the changing terms of
American state-society relations?
In seeking to answer such critical questions, conventional historical
accounts of the American income tax have generally focused on the need for
government revenue as the primary explanatory factor. According to this
view, the rise of the income tax can be best explained as a structural-
functionalist response to the growing demands of the public sector, par-
ticularly during wartime emergencies Other common interpretations have
examined the role of political parties and party competition over the issue of
protectionism and tariff revenue in explaining why the corporate and individual
income taxes were adopted when they were.' Still other studies, those that have
set out to explore the redistributive potential of tax laws, have generally
concluded that the roots and early development of the American income tax
rest more with placating revenue demands than with issues of economic equity.
For this last group of scholars, the income tax, like many other reforms of the
Progressive Era, is viewed as a form of sophisticated conservatism-a clever
ploy to domesticate potentially more radical forms of wealth redistribution.'
7. See WITTE, supra note 4, at 67; Bennett D. Baack & Edward John Ray, Special Interests
and the Adoption of the Income Tax in the United States, 45 J. ECON. HIST. 607 (1985). Scholars of
state formation have long recognized the importance of wars and national crises to the political
development of western nation-states, see, for example, JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER:
WAR, MONEY AND THE ENGLISH STATE, 1688-1783 (1989); CHARLES TILLY, COERCION,
CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES, A.D. 990-1990 (1990); Gabriel Ardant, Financial Policy and
Economic Infrastructure of Modern States and Nations, in THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES
IN WESTERN EUROPE 164 (Charles Tilly ed., 1975).
8. See generally CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX
EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 49-50 (1997); ELIZABETH
SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN STATE, 1877-1917, at
160-72 (1999); RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877-1900, at 159-61 (2000).
9. As the tax historian Robert Stanley has interpreted it, the income tax "represented not an
expression of real economic democracy," but rather "a rejection of the far more fundamental
institutional change advocated by intellectuals and street dissidents of both left and right." ROBERT
STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX,
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While this concentrated focus on the functional demands for govern-
ment revenue explains one element in the development of the income tax, it
tells us only part of the historical story. Taxation has always been both about
revenue and equity-about effectively raising government funds and fairly
distributing fiscal burdens. The accepted narratives and interpretations that
view the ascendancy of the income tax as primarily part of a revenue-
generating process, or more cynically, as a conservative ruse to forestall more
radical calls for economic redistribution, have marginalized the importance of
the reallocative potential of taxation."0 Put simply, the preoccupation with
revenue has elided how the early evolution of income tax laws and policy was
also driven by the desire to reallocate more fairly the burdens of financing a
modem nation-state.
This Article, by contrast, contends that the turn-of-the-century devel-
opment of the income tax had sources in social concerns about justice, fair-
ness, and the equitable distribution of fiscal burdens. More specifically, this
Article claims that the intellectual campaign for an income tax was aimed at
reforming the contemporary allocation of fiscal burdens and obligations.
Common historical accounts that have focused on the failure of the income
tax to redistribute wealth have obscured our understanding of what the rise of
the direct taxation of income did, in fact, accomplish. The new fiscal order
that emerged at the turn of the century was by no means a radical system of
wealth redistribution, nor was it merely a conservative bulwark against more
1861-1913, at 231 (1993). Similarly, Morton Horwitz has claimed that limits placed on the state's
taxing powers exemplify how "the impermissibility of redistribution embodied one of the central
tenets of the nineteenth-century idea of the liberal state." MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992);
see also GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-t916, at 112, 129 (1963); JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE
IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE, 1900-1918, at 140-42 (1968). For more tax-specific historical
works in this vein, see LOUIS EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION (1961); MARK H. LEFF,
THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION, 1933-1939 (1984); JAMES
O'CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE (1973); Albert L. Ellis, The Regressive Era:
Progressive Era Tax Reform and the National Tax Association-Roots of the Modem American
Tax Structure (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University).
10. The distinction between redistribution and reallocation is a subtle one. The
Progressive-Era public finance economists championed an income tax to reallocate or spread the
fiscal burdens of financing a modem nation-state among a larger group of citizens. Many of them
did not envision a steeply graduated tax system working in conjunction with government transfer
payments to redistribute wealth radically.
11. While there is an older historiography of American taxation that celebrates the
achievements of the income tax, this literature is often infused with a tone of liberal triumphalism
that depicts the creation and development of the income tax as part of a teleological march towards
democratic progress, See generally ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX (1940); RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1954); SIDNEY RATNER,
AMERICAN TAXATION, ITS HISTORY AS A SOCIAL FORCE IN DEMOCRACY (1942).
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radical reform. Instead, the modem American fiscal state that emerged in the
early twentieth century dramatically altered the distribution of fiscal burdens
along lines of both class and region. By replacing the nineteenth-century
structure of regressive, indirect consumption taxes with a direct tax on income
and other forms of wealth, the new fiscal polity shifted the burden of financing
a modem, industrial state to those segments of society that had the greatest tax-
paying ability, namely wealthy citizens in the North and Northeast. This
transformation toward a more transparent and fairer system of taxation was a
qualified achievement. Although it did not go as far as some progressive
reformers had envisioned, this new fiscal polity laid the foundation for and held
out the promise of a new, more progressive American tax regime.
Among the forces that helped forge the modern American fiscal state,
perhaps none was more important than the intellectual movement sup-
porting the direct and graduated taxation of income. To be sure, there were
other salient factors that helped usher in this new fiscal order, including
popular social movements and institutional changes. Academic theorists
alone could not have built the new fiscal polity. Nonetheless, the turn-of-
the-century structural transformation in American public finance was
guided mainly by a paradigm shift in the legal and economic theories that
undergirded tax policy. It was academic political economists, with significant
German training, who responded to the social and political circumstances
of the times by leading the intellectual movement for a permanent,
progressive income tax. In so doing, these theorists became the architects
or visionaries of the modem American fiscal state.
This Article explores how these key American intellectuals, responding
to their historical conditions, were able to apply their social and political
theories to the development of American tax laws and policies. More
precisely, this Article contends that a particular group of academic political
economists played a pivotal role in supplanting the "benefits theory" of
taxation, and its concomitant vision of the state as a passive protector of
private property, with a more equitable principle of taxation based on one's
"faculty" or "ability to pay"-a principle that promoted an active role for the
positive state in the distribution of fiscal burdens.
12. The larger work-in-progress, from which this Article is derived, explores the multitude
of idealistic and material forces that affected the emergence of the income tax at the turn of the
twentieth century, including the influence of the legal profession and the popular social
movements for tax reform. For an earlier version of this project, see Ajay K. Mehrotra, Creating
the Modern American Fiscal State: The Political Economy of U.S. Tax Policy, 1880-1930 (2003)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago).
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This historical shift in the economic and legal ideas that undergirded
tax policy was reflective of a much larger transformation in American social
thought at the turn of the century. For the move from benefits to ability to
pay was part and parcel of what American intellectual historians have
referred to as "the revolt against formalism"-a revolt that included a
transformation in American liberalism away from its classical nineteenth-
century emphasis on negative individual liberties toward a more progressive
and revitalized conception that stressed an active role for the positive
state. 3 Spurred by the modem forces of mass immigration, urbanization,
and industrialization that created a much more interdependent world, this
change in American liberalism, embodied in the Progressive Movement,
had a profound impact not only on tax policy, but also on nearly every
aspect of state-society relations. In the realm of tax law, as the historian
James T. Kloppenberg has noted, "It]he graduated income tax, based on the
idea that everyone owes a debt to society proportional to his ability to pay,
was perhaps the quintessential progressive reform."' 4  Protective labor
legislation, the rise of antitrust laws, the regulation of food and drugs, the
expansion of suffrage to women, and the numerous other reforms produced
during this crucial period in American history were all representative of the
progressive reorientation of the relationship between society, economy, and
the state.15
Furthermore, this paradigm shift in economic and legal theory was not
simply a rhetorical move. Rather, it was an attempt to foment a kind of sci-
entific revolution in thinking about how the burdens and obligations of
13. See generally MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT
AGAINST FORMALISM (Beacon Press 1957) (1949). See also EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE
CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973);
LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001); JEFF SKLANSKY, THE SOUL'S ECONOMY:
MARKET SOCIETY & SELFHOOD IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1820-1920 (2002). For more on the
changing face of American liberalism at the turn of the twentieth century, see Mary 0. Furner,
Knowing Capitalism: Public Investigation and the Labor Question in the Long Progressive Era, in THE
STATE AND ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE: THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH EXPERIENCES 241 (Mary 0.
Furner & Barry Supple eds., 1990). On the transatlantic aspects of this new form of liberalism, see
JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870-1920 (1986); DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC
CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE (1998). For a recent reinterpretation of
this period of American liberalism, see NANCY COHEN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN
LIBERALISM, 1865-1914 (2002).
14. KLOPPENBERG, supra note 13, at 355.
15. See generally SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ-FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE (1956);
MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CH lANGE IN
AMERICA, 1900-1933 (1990); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982); ROBERT H.
WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967).
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citizenship ought to be allocated. Triggered by a community of rising eco-
nomic specialists, this tectonic shift-like most paradigm shifts-was not
simply a new scientific discovery nor an apolitical, wholly objective revision
in describing modern social relations. Instead, it was "a special sort of
change involving a certain sort of reconstruction of group commitments. '6
The Progressive-Era economists who brought the faculty theory to the fore
were part of a new community of economic thinkers-coming together
alongside the rise of the American research university. These academics
were seeking to change the constellation of beliefs, commitments, and val-
ues within their own emerging academic discipline. In the process, they
were hoping to underwrite changes in tax policy that would help reallocate
the fiscal burdens associated with modem, industrial capitalism.
For many of these economists, the benefits theory and the ability-to-
pay principle were contending doctrines with radically different underlying
social and political theories. The benefits doctrine stood for the antiquated
proposition, they believed, that taxation was justified as a price paid for the
goods and services provided by government in exchange for tax payments.
Citizens, in essence, traded tax payments solely for the benefits that they
received from the state. By contrast, the notion of faculty, or ability to pay,
required that each citizen contribute to the common welfare of the state
based on tax-paying capacity. Although accurately measuring a citizen's
capacity to pay taxes was a controversial issue that remained elusive-then
and now1S-the progressive economists resolutely believed that their pri-
mary, pragmatic goal in advancing the income tax agenda was to demonstrate
the social and political limitations inherent in the benefits principle. That
is not to say they thought the benefits principle had no place in discussions
about tax policy; their goal instead was to make more explicit the politics
16. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 181 (1996); see
also THEODORE PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND
PUBLIC LIFE (1995).
17. See generally MARY 0. FURNER, ADVOCACY & OBJEC-7IVITY: A CRISIS IN THE
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1865-1905 (1975); THOMAS L. HASKELL,
THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE
ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
2000) (1977); DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1991).
18. On the ongoing elusiveness of the ability-to-pay doctrine, see, for example, LIAM
MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 20-31 (2002);
Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership, and Ability-to-pay
Principles, 58 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2005); EISENSTEIN, supra note 9. For a concise recent
discussion of one of the meanings of ability to pay, see generally Kirk J. Stark, Enslaving the
Beachcomber: Some Thoughts on the Liberty Objections to Endowment Taxation, 18 CANADIAN J.L. &
JuRis. 47 (2005).
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implicit in the dueling tax notions. The public finance economists, like
other progressive reformers, used the language of ethical duties and the
idiom of social solidarity "less to clarify a political philosophy than to build
a political constituency."' 9
In facilitating this theoretical shift in tax policy, these thinkers were
responding to a number of social and intellectual forces. The growing con-
centration of wealth and corporate power, the cycle of economic crisis, and
the resulting tension between social movements for reform-as well as the
conservative reactions they elicited-all influenced academic ideas during
the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. Likewise, the increasing prevalence of
intangible wealth in the form of stocks and bonds, and the institutionalization
of relatively new economic ideas about measuring value as a function of an
individual's marginal utility, combined with material forces to provide
reform-minded economists with rationales for promoting a progressive income
tax. Led by Richard T. Ely, Henry Carter Adams, and Edwin R.A. Seligman,
these economists were at the forefront of the battle to dismantle the orthodox
theories of laissez-faire and to promote the adoption of new, more effective, and
equitable forms of taxation.'o
A century or so has passed since the progressive economists' intellectual
campaign for a graduated income tax facilitated the structural transformation in
American public finance. Though much has changed since then, some alarming
similarities seem to have reemerged. As the subtitle of this Symposium
19. Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REVIEWS IN AM. HISTORY No. 4, Dec. 1982,
at 113, 122. See generally BUENKER, supra note 3; Gina L Keel, A Social Fiscal Science: The Progressive
Origins of Federal Income Taxation (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University).
20. In charting the role that these economists played in laying the intellectual groundwork
for the new fiscal order, this Article is not meant to be a traditional history of disembodied ideas
or a philosophical explication of the claims made by these historical figures. Instead, this Article
seeks to historicize the ideas that underwrote the emergence of the modem income tax by placing
these theories within their social, political, and economic context. The principal aim is to show
how idealistic and material historical forces combined to facilitate the paradigm shift in tax
theories at the turn of the twentieth century. The more normative task of uncovering the current
philosophical arguments for and against progressive income taxes, and revealing the tensions
within tax theories, is left to other articles published in this Symposium and elsewhere. See, e.g.,
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Choosing a Tax Rate Structure in the Face of Disagreement, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 1697 (2005); MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 18; Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The
Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952); CHARLES GALVIN & BORIS
1. BITTKER, THE INCOME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE SHOULD IT BE? (1969); Jeffrey A.
Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical Bases for Unequal
Taxation of Individuals, 12 AMER. J. TAX POL'Y 221 (1995); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith,
Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905
(1987). On the inherent tensions within the tax theory of ability to pay, see Stephen Utz, Ability
to Pay, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 867 (2002).
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21
suggests, the turn of the twenty-first century has brought with it a new era of
rising inequality. This era has placed into bold relief what some present-day
commentators see as the possibility of a New Gilded Age in the United States,
complete with a new generation of robber barons, a renewed visibility of
material opulence and excess, and a new set of political and corporate scandals."
Amid these circumstances, a story about the intellectual foundations of
the American income tax may provide some important, if humbling, lessons
for our own time. Given the recent rise of inequality and the current
rhetorical calls for tax reform,23 a tale chronicling the historical beginnings of
the current American income tax system should be seen as a modest reminder
of the aims and circumstances that animated the theoretical support for a
new system of taxation. This narrative serves as a reminder, that is, of the
historical and institutional parameters that constrain current policymakers.
Similarly, an intellectual history of the American income tax holds
some sobering lessons both for those scholars who mistakenly assume, how-
ever implicitly, that the progressive income tax was originally meant to redis-
tribute wealth and income in a dramatic way,24 and for those tax scholars
who recently have suggested a return to benefits theory as a possible means to
bolster our current tax system.25 This Article thus attempts to tell the story of
how one group of socially engaged and reform-minded academics provided
the intellectual support for a historic change in the American system of
taxation-a change that continues to resonate today.
21. Symposium, Rethinking Redistribution: Tax Policy in an Era of Rising Inequality, 52 UCLA
L. REV. 1627 (2005).
22. For a sampling of the recent social and academic commentary identifying the rise of a
new Gilded Age at the turn of the twenty-first century, see generally GODFREY HODGSON, MORE
EQUAL THAN OTHERS: AMERICA FROM NIXON TO THE NEW CENTURY (2004); KEVIN PHILLIPS,
THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR: WEALTH AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE IN THE REAGAN
AFTERMATH (1990); THE NEW GILDED AGE (David Remnick ed., 2001); Nathan Glazer, On the
American Indifference to Inequality, DAEDALUS, Summer 2003, at 111; Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The
Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993 (2004); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel
Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998, 118 QJ. ECON. 1 (2003); Paul Ktugman,
For Richer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, (Magazine), at 62; Meritocracy in America: Ever Higher
Society, Ever Higher to Ascend, ECONOMIST, Jan. 1-7, 2005, at 22.
23. DANIEL ALTMAN, NEOCONOMY: GEORGE BUSH'S REVOLUTIONARY GAMBLE WITH
AMERICA'S FUTURE (2004); McMahon, supra note 22, at 993; Hal R. Varian, Perhaps It's Time for
a Thorough Tax Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2005, at C2.
24. See, e.g., STANLEY, supra note 9; WITTE, supra note 4.
25. Deborah A. Geier, Incremental Versus Fundamental Tax Reform and the Top One Percent,
56 SMU L. REV. 99, 119 (2003); Deborah A. Geier, Letter to the Editor, Time to Bring Back the
"Benefit" Norm?, 102 TAX NOTES 1155 (2004); Herwig J. Schlunk, Double Taxation: The Unappreciated
Ideal, 102 TAX NOTES 893 (2004); Herwig J. Schlunk, I Come Not to Praise the Corporate Income
Tax, But to Save It, 56 TAX L. REV. 329 (2003). For another critique of the recent reemergence of
the benefits theory, see Dodge, supra note 18.
This Article is divided into three parts. To comprehend the signifi-
cance of the transformation in American public finance that the establish-
ment of the federal income tax occasioned, Part I contains a brief
description of the nineteenth-century system of indirect taxes, and an
explanation of the historical factors that led to the decline of this old fiscal
order. Part II focuses on the public finance economists of the turn of the
century and their efforts to use the logic of faculty theory to underwrite the
movement for a progressive income tax. This part begins with an introduc-
tion of the common background and experiences that united this young
generation of professional economists; it then charts how these theorists
were able to apply their new visions of political economy to tax policy, as
they helped establish the intellectual foundations of the modem American
fiscal state. Part III investigates the resistance-from both the political left
and right-that these theorists faced in promoting a progressive income tax
based on the notion of ability to pay. This last part also explores the endur-
ing impact that these ideas had on the development of tax laws and poli-
cies. Finally, the Conclusion explains why, at the dawn of the twenty-first
century, a historical tale about the intellectual foundations of the modem
American income tax remains poignant.
I. THE OLD FISCAL ORDER AND ITS GRADUAL DEMISE
Given the current predominance of the direct tax on income, it is easy
to overlook the extent to which indirect taxes, particularly import duties,
dominated federal revenues throughout the nineteenth century. On aver-
age, revenues from the tariff accounted for approximately 85 percent of the
annual federal budget during the antebellum period.26 Although the crisis
of the Civil War temporarily introduced a successful national income tax in
the North,27 indirect excise taxes on imports and everyday commodities
such as sugar, alcohol, and tobacco remained the cornerstone of federal
receipts throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century.8 Of course,
26. HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE U.S., supra note 1, at 1106. "[During] the antebellum
period, proceeds from the tariff fell below 75 percent of federal income only during the Jackson
and Van Buren administrations, when brisk sales of federal land contributed significantly to the
federal treasury." John Mark Hansen, Taxation and the Political Economy of the Tariff, 44 INT'L
ORG. 527, 529 (1990).
27. BROWNLEE, supra note 4, at 26-27; STANLEY, supra note 9, at 27-32; WITTE, supra
note 4, at 67.
28. As late as 1890, more than 90 percent of federal government revenues came from the
combination of customs duties and internal excise taxes. HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE U.S.,
supra note 1, at 1106-08.
Envisioning the Modem American Fiscal State 1803
federal government spending at this time was rather paltry. The federal
budget was relatively small, with spending limited to the military and the
legacy of the Civil War.29 Nevertheless, as federal government spending
increased at the turn of the century, the indirect system of taxation contin-
ued to dominate, at least until the First World War."0
This system of indirect taxation affected nearly every aspect of daily
consumption. The breadth of goods that fell under the tariffs duty list in the
late nineteenth century was indeed astonishing. The Tariff Act of 1883, for
instance, placed a levy on fourteen different categories of products including:
"Chemical Products"; "Earthenware and glassware"; "Metals"; "Wood and
Wooden wares"; "Sugar"; "Cotton and cotton Goods"; "Hemp, jute, and flax
Goods"; "Wool and woolens"; "Silk and silk Goods"; "Books [and] papers";
and the catch-all category of miscellaneous "Sundries."3 The schedule for
"Provisions" alone consisted of such everyday necessities as "Beef and pork;
Hams and bacon; Cheese; Butter; and substitutes thereof; Lard; Wheat; Rye
and barley; Oats; Corn-meal; Oat-meal; Rye-flour; Potato or corn starch;
Potatoes; Rice; Hay; Honey; Hops; Milk; Salmon and other fish; Pickles and
sources, of all kinds; Vegetables; Vinegar; Chocolate; Dates, plums and
prunes; Oranges; Lemons; Raisins," and a large assortment of nuts.32
Although the "duty charges," or rates, were relatively low, ranging from "one
cent per pound of beef and pork" to "four cents per pound of cheese,"33 they
had a significant impact on the daily cost of living in America.
The potential inflationary pressures occasioned by import duties and
the overall indirect system of taxation were not lost on social and political
commentators. Even opponents of the income tax, such as The New York
Times, frequently observed how the "essential character of our protective
policy. . . artificially and cruelly increase[s] the cost of clothing, of bedding,
of shelter, of tools, and of a thousand necessaries of daily life."34 Though it
29. In 1890, for instance, the federal government spent more than 20 percent of its budget
on the military, 11 percent on servicing its debt, much of which was acquired during the Civil
War, and over 33 percent on Civil War pensions-that quintessential protowelfare state measure.
Id. at 1114. For more on the history of Civil War pensions, see generally THEDA SKOCPOL,
PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES (1992).
30. In 1916, for instance, revenues from the tariff and indirect excise taxes accounted for
nearly 60 percent of federal receipts. HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE U.S., supra note 1, at
1106-08. On the political history of the early income tax laws, see generally JEROLD L.
WALTMAN, POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE U.S. INCOME TAX (1985).
31. Tariff Act of Mar. 3, 1883, ch. 121, § 2502, 22 Star. 488, 495-502, 505-14.
32. Id. at 503-04.
33. Id. at 503.
34. Taxing Food, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1891, at 4.
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was unclear, as economic analysts at the time noted,35 whether the tariff
ultimately was shifted to consumers, many ordinary Americans believed
that taxes were responsible for the rising cost of living. As The New York
Times editors noted, this popular perception could have grave political
implications for lawmakers. "[Tihe prompt rise in prices of the common
necessaries of life," an editorial written during the height of the 1890 tariff
debates observed, "is bringing the Republican tariff home to the masses of
voters in a way highly unsatisfactory to those who made that tariff.
3 6
For many policymakers and economic commentators, increasing prices
were just one of the adverse effects of the indirect tax regime. A revenue
system based on customs duties and excise taxes also proved to be unstable,
inflexible, and unfair. It was unstable because receipts varied with the
vicissitudes of international trade and social consumption patterns. It was
inflexible because it gave government actors little leverage over the source
of funds. And it was unfair because the bulk of the burden appeared to fall
on those with limited economic resources. These drawbacks became par-
ticularly pronounced during times of national stress and strain, when crisis
often required governments to access revenue quickly and effectively.
Writing in the wake of the Panic of 1893, during the last great recession of
the nineteenth century, University of Chicago labor economist Robert
Hoxie observed that "the customs revenue system, through inherent inflexi-
bility and instability, is incapable of serving as an adequate source of public
revenue in times of emergency."37 Because moments of national crisis were
crucial testing grounds, "[n]o nation could be found willing to base its
finances on a system that must fail it in time of stress," Hoxie continued."
"This conclusion then is really equivalent to a general condemnation of the
customs revenue system as the main source of a national income."'39
In addition to its internal defects, the tariff was also criticized because
its protection of domestic industries undermined the economic ideals of free
trade. For economists and reformers weaned on the treatises of Adam
35. Edwin Seligman, himself an authority on the incidence of taxes, observed that the
factors that determined the incidence of import duties
are so numerous and so complex that an investigation of the actual effects of a tax upon
any one class of commodities would require for its proper solution, not only an
acquaintance with the details of theory itself, but also an intimate knowledge of all the
forces influencing the supply of, and the demand for, the commodities affected.
EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE SHIFTING AND INCIDENCE OF TAXATION 374 (1899).
36. Object Lessons in Tariff, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1890, at 8.
37. Robert F. Hoxie, Adequacy of the Customs Revenue System, 3 J. POL. ECON. 39, 71 (1894).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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Smith and John Stuart Mill, the benefits of comparative advantage had made
free trade an obvious choice." There were, of course, many American
economic thinkers who favored protecting "infant industries." Henry C.
Carey, the Pennsylvania publisher and economic writer, trained generations of
antebellum students to believe in the virtues of a high protective tariff." But
after the Civil War, when the inherent flaws of the tariff and indirect
consumption taxes became more readily apparent, free-trade thinking came to
dominate, at least within the academy. The leading American economic
treatises, written by Amasa Walker and Arthur Latham Perry, supported free
trade, as did a number of popular tracts and pamphlets written by tariff
reformers.42 Though there was a handful of young, progressive economists who
favored protectionism, such as Simon Patten, free-trade ideas seemed to
dominate American academic discourse by the end of the nineteenth century. 3
Yet despite this seeming convergence around free-trade ideas, the
protective tariff remained a central part of American economic and foreign
policy throughout the turn of the century. The political and economic
powers behind protectionism not only had access to the ears and pockets of
influential lawmakers, they also were able to muffle the voices of some of
the leading economic thinkers. Organizations such as the American Iron and
Steel Association, the Boston Home Market Club, and the American
Protective Tariff League disseminated pro-tariff pamphlets, raised campaign
funds, and lobbied lawmakers on behalf of protectionism." With powerful
economic interests exerting pressure on the tariff question, even the fore-
most authority on the tariff, the Harvard economist F.W. Taussig, was hesi-
tant in completely repudiating protectionism.45
The regional politics behind tariff reform only seemed to reinforce the
resiliency of protectionism. The tariff had long been an issue endemic in
40. See JUDITH GOLDSTEIN, IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 81-136
(1993); JOANNE REITANO, THE TARIFF QUESTION IN THE GILDED AGE: THE GREAT DEBATE OF
1888, at 9-10 (1994).
41. See HENRY C. CAREY, THE FINANCE MINISTER, THE CURRENCY AND THE PUBLIC
DEBT 11-15 (1863); 1 HENRY C. CAREY, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1837); 3 JOSEPH
DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION, 1865-1918, at 6-7 (Augustus M.
Kelley ed., 1969).
42. REITANO, supra note 40, at 57-58.
43. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 40, at 88. For a more thorough investigation of the historical
development of free-trade ideas and the opposition they faced from antiquity to the twentieth
century, see generally DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF
FREE TRADE (1996).
44. REITANO, suprra note 40, at 115-16.
45. See 3 DORFMAN, supra note 41, at 270-71; F.W. TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES (1898).
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American politics, pitting the northeastern Republican interests that
favored protectionism against the more agrarian political base of the
Democratic Party. Incessant logrolling over revisions to the duties list, and
the ability to link tariff revenues to particular spending programs, permitted
lawmakers to exploit the differences in regional interests. After the Civil
War, Republicans were able to widen and tighten their hold over the pro-
tective tariff by appealing to new sets of constituents. By adding items such
as wool, hides, and grains to the duties list, northeastern Republicans were
able to bring western and midwestern farming interests into the protectionist
fold.46 Moreover, Republicans used revenues from the tariff to underwrite
the nation's first proto-welfare provisions: Civil War pensions." Because
only Union Army veterans were eligible for these pensions, Republicans
were able to solidify their support for the tariff in the North and West, while
further marginalizing the resistance of southern Democrats.9
Despite these economic and political factors, the popularity of the tar-
iff began to wane at the turn of the century. Because economic ideas alone
were not enough to erode the traditional reliance on the indirect system of
taxation, other, more material conditions helped to hasten the demise of
the ancien tax regime. Foremost among these factors was the deterioration
49
of the Republican Party's political coalition supporting protectionism.
Increasing federal government surpluses, an aging population of Civil War
veterans, and a mature industrial economy with large corporations search-
ing for overseas markets all contributed to the skepticism surrounding pro-
tectionism.50 Democrats and progressive Republicans began questioning
whether the protective tariff created more detriments than benefits. The
rising cost of living and the increasing concentration of wealth and corporate
capital, tariff opponents claimed, were directly tied to the Republican
agenda of high import duties. The growing consolidation of large corporations,
and the increasing fortunes of their owners, seemed to confirm that the
protective tariff had outlived its usefulness as a device to shield infant
51domestic industries from international competition.
A similar, though less pronounced, deterioration of the old fiscal order
was occurring at the state and local level at about the same time. Throughout
46. SANDERS, supra note 8, at 217-19.
47. RICHARD F. BENSEL, SECTIONALISM AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT,
1880-1980, at 60-103 (1984); SKOCPOL, supra note 29, at 112-14.
48. See PAUL WOLMAN, MOST FAVORED NATION: THE REPUBLICAN REVISIONISTS AND
U.S. TARIFF POLICY, 1897-1912 (1992); REITANO, supra note 40, at 119; Hansen, supra note 26.
49. SANDERS, supra note 8, at 164.
50. WOLMAN, supra note 48, at xii, 2-3.
51. SANDERS, supra note 8, at 217-36
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the nineteenth century, the general property tax-a measure that began as
a levy on real property and then later included personal property-domi-
nated state and local revenues. As late as 1890, the property tax accounted
for over 70 percent of state revenues and roughly 90 percent of local
receipts. 2 Over time, however, structural changes in the economy gradually
began to erode the ability of the general property tax to provide sufficient
revenue, particularly in the face of increasing government demands for
funds.5  With the institutional development of finance capitalism, new
forms of intangible wealth-namely stocks, bonds, and other financial
assets-became increasingly prevalent. 4 As they did, the administration of
the property tax, which had always been open to malfeasance of one sort or
another, became even more arbitrary, as wealth held in the form of financial
assets often eluded property tax assessment. Preoccupied by the failings of this
levy, tax reformers focused their early efforts on discrediting this antiquated tax.s
As support for the tariff and property taxes waned, other pressures
compelled governments at all levels to consider alternative forms of financ-
ing. If the demise of the old tax regime was diminishing the supply of gov-
ernment funds, geopolitical and demographic forces were having the
opposite effect on the demand for government resources. Although interest
payments on the national debt began to decline in the last decades of the
nineteenth century, as the Civil War debts were retired and the number of
Civil War pensioners was gradually declining, the federal government was
becoming increasingly active at home and abroad in the decades straddling
the turn of the century. 5 The Spanish-American War and the beginnings
of an overseas U.S. military empire required increased funds, as did the rise
and maintenance of new regulatory and administrative agencies.57 State
and local governments faced similar pressures, as ships teeming with new
52. GEORGE C.S. BENSON ET AL., THE AMERICAN PROPERTY TAX: ITS HISTORY,
ADMINISTRATION, AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 83 (1965).
53. See generally GLENN W. FISHER, THE WORST TAX? A HISTORY OF TI-E PROPERTY TAX
IN AMERICA (1996); JON C. TEAFORD, THE RISE OF THE STATES: EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN
STATE GOVERNMENT 42-68 (2002).
54. WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION IN AMERICA 4-5 (1997).
55. C.K. YEARLEY, THE MONEY MACHINES: THE BREAKDOWN AND REFORM OF
GOVERNMENTAL AND PARTY FINANCE IN THE NORTH, 1860-1920, at 39-41 (1970); see text
accompanying infra notes 184-186.
56. See generally FINE, supra note 15; WILLIAM A. WILLIAMS, THE TRAGEDY OF
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (1959).
57. By 1900, spending on the Department of Army and Navy constituted the single largest
category of federal spending, amounting to almost 40 percent of total spending. HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE U.S., supra note 1, at 1115.
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immigrants brought demographic pressures to bear on dilapidated systems of
infrastructure and social services. The calls for public spending were especially
strong at the state level during the "halcyon days of the urban promoters,"
when "boosters of each city believed that the best way to guarantee
prosperity in the future was to create the state's smoothest streets, fastest
transportation system, most efficient garbage removal, biggest schools, and
best fire and police protection. ' '..
These two issues-the decreasing supply of financial resources and the
increasing demand for government revenue-combined to create a kind of
fiscal crisis in governance at the turn of the century. With policymakers and leg-
islators searching for alternative ways to meet the mounting demands placed
upon the public sector, economists competed with other, more organized
political coalitions in attempting to shape tax policy. Some interest groups,
namely corporations, sought to limit state spending and make the administration
of government more rational and routinized-and hence more business-like. 9
Other groups, like the reform-minded economists, suggested more fundamental
changes, including the adoption of income taxes.
The mismatch between the supply of funds and the demand for increased
government spending combined with another factor, the growing disparity of
wealth, to spur the turn-of-the-century transformation in American public
finance. As modem economic historians have suggested, the distribution of
wealth in the United States became increasingly concentrated in the late
nineteenth century.60 Commentators at the time were well aware of this trend
in inequality. In 1893, the federal statistician George K. Holmes employed
data from the 1890 census to estimate that 91 percent of the nation's families
owned less than 30 percent of the national wealth, while 9 percent controlled
the remaining 70 percent."' Although Holmes was no proponent of radical
wealth redistribution, he warned that "there is always the danger that [the
58. DAVID P. THELEN, THE NEW CITIZENSHIP: ORIGINS OF PROGRESSIVISM IN
WISCONSIN, 1885-1900, at 133-34 (1972). With the onset of the depression of the late 1890s,
many Wisconsin cities increased their public spending as they "demonstrated a sense of obligation
to their unemployed by hiring them as street sweepers and by undertaking larger public works
projects that also required manpower." Id. at 62.
59. See generally R. RUDY HIGGENS-EVENSON, THE PRICE OF PROGRESS: PUBLIC SERVICES,
TAXATION, AND THE AMERICAN CORPORATE STATE (2003); TEAFORD, supra note 53.
60. Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 19 (1955);
Richard H. Steckel & Carolyn M. Moehling, Rising Inequality: Trends in the Distribution of Wealth
in Industrializing New England, 61 J. ECON. HIST. 160 (2001). For a concise summary of the
economic history literature on this topic, see Clayne Pope, Inequality in the Nineteenth Century, in
2 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 109 (Stanley L. Engerman &
Robert E. Gallman eds., 2000).
61. George K. Holmes, The Concentration of Wealth, 8 POL. SCI. Q 589, 592 (1893).
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rich] will get too large a hold upon the wealth, the resources and the labor
of the country," in which case "the most effective and practicable remedies
are progressive taxes on incomes, gifts and inheritances." 2 Only through
such measures could society ensure "a distribution. . . most conducive to
social welfare. 63
The results of empirical studies conducted by Holmes and others
reached nearly every comer of American society. 6  Writing in the pages of
the American Federationist, the official newspaper of the American Federation
of Labor, Eltweed Pomeroy commented on how American society had
reached an unprecedented level of inequality. Citing to some of the leading
empirical studies of the day, Pomeroy confidently concluded, "Today the sun
looks down on the most unequal and inequitable distribution of wealth that
has probably ever been seen."6 5  Among the primary causes of this new
concentration of wealth, Pomeroy identified "indirect and inequitable
taxation, and special and monopoly privilege" as the most significant.
6
Many social critics even went so far as to attribute the visible poverty
and class conflict of the times to this growing disparity of wealth and oppor-
tunity. Indeed, the Panic of 1893, which triggered an ensuing depression,
exacerbated the visibility of growing poverty and class conflict. Marked by many
economic historians as "among the most severe" depressions in the United
States, the business contraction of the mid-1890s brought with it an
unemployment rate of approximately 20 percent, a bank failure rate that
was surpassed only by the Great Depression, and a rate of general business
failures that was utterly astounding to most contemporary commentators.
The economic depression, in turn, exacerbated the tensions within indus-
trial relations, triggering further strikes and labor unrest. It was against this
backdrop of growing dissatisfaction with the existing sources of revenue,
62. Id. at 599-600.
63. Id. at 600. Holmes was also no proponent of the environmental explanation for
poverty. He believed that "the defects of human nature" helped explain the maldistribution of
wealth. Id. at 599. "There is a large element of the population unfitted to save or to earn much,
and unqualified to use and keep considerable wealth," Holmes wrote. Id. "Until the race
improves this class out of existence, there will be an extreme of poverty-the penalty of
shiftlessness, improvidence, a want of economy and deficient industry." Id.
64. Id.; see also CHARLES B. SPAHR, AN ESSAY ON THE PRESENT DISTRIBUTION OF
WEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES (1896).
65. Eltweed Pomeroy, The Concentration of Wealth and the Inheritance Charge, AM.
FEDERATIONIST, July 1895, at L.
66. Id.
67. CHARLES HOFFMANN, THE DEPRESSION OF THE NINETIES: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY
4, 57-58, 109, 285-97 (1970); GERALD T. WHITE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE PROBLEM OF
RECOVERY AFTER 1893 (1982).
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increasing pressure for more government spending, and concerns over rising
inequality and class conflict, that the Progressive-Era economists made their
mark in molding the theoretical parameters of the modem American fiscal state.
II. THE PROGRESSIVE PUBLIC FINANCE ECONOMISTS
The professional economists who led the campaign for an income tax
at the turn of the century were part of a larger cohort of academic social
scientists who were seeking to dismantle the orthodox theories of laissez-
faire that dominated classical and neoclassical visions of law and political
economy. Responding to the material forces of modernity that had eroded
notions of self-reliant individualism, this rising class of professional social
scientists sought to demonstrate, through their writings and teachings, the
mutual interdependence of modem social relations. With the
establishment of the American Economic Association (AEA) in 1895,
these economists were among the first group of social scientists to sever
their ties to the general antebellum field of moral philosophy and place
their discipline on a new professional standing. And like the other
professional social scientists of their generation, these young economists
believed that their economic expertise would place their ideas and policies
above the fray of everyday politics. Though their vision of "science" often
varied from the views of other academics, the new generation of economists
implicitly claimed that their objective, apolitical knowledge legitimated
their pronouncements."
From the beginning, the young generation of economists who founded
the AEA sought to use their training to address the social concerns of the
day. Calling themselves the "new school" of American political economy,
these young maverick intellectuals challenged the reigning system of economic
thought. 9 Eschewing timeless universalisms, these academics resolutely
believed that economic relations were embedded in a larger social and
institutional matrix-a matrix that was often constituted by law and legal
processes. Although seeds of this institutionalist strand of American economic
thought did not fully blossom until the 1920s and early 1930s, alongside
American legal realism, many of the leading new school economists were eager
68. For more on the professionalization of the social sciences, see generally sources cited
supra note 17.
69. For more on the "new school" of American political economy, see generally FINE, supra
note 15, at 212-21; FuRNER, supra note 17, at 59-80.
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to use the law to exercise the "ethical agency" of state power." Many of these
ethical or proto-institutionalist economists were indeed part of what legal
historians have identified as the "First Great Law & Economics Movement.,
71
Among this first generation of professionally trained economists, there
were several who were interested in public finance. Occupying influential
teaching posts throughout the country, academics such as Henry Carter
Adams, Richard T. Ely, and Edwin R.A. Seligman dedicated much of their
careers to the empirical and theoretical study of taxation. Adams, who
spent the majority of his academic career at the University of Michigan
(after a tumultuous experience at Cornell)," focused his early scholarship
on public finance and wrote some of the earliest, most influential American
treatises on budgets and public debts." When he was appointed chief
statistician of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, Adams's
attention turned away from fiscal issues to the regulation of railroads, the
topic for which he is best remembered today.4
Ely, likewise, began his academic career with an interest in public
finance. He investigated state and local tax issues as a member of the
Baltimore and Maryland tax commissions while he was a junior faculty
member at the Johns Hopkins University." And, like Adams, he turned his
attention to other matters later in his career. When he joined the University
70. FINE, supra note 15, at 216-19; FURNER, supra note 17, at 69-75. In drafting the initial
charter of the American Economic Association (AEA), Richard Ely explicitly proclaimed that the
state should be viewed as an "ethical agency whose positive aid is an indispensable condition of
human progress." RICHARD T. ELY, GROUND UNDER OUR FEET: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 136
(1938). Ely's language for the charter led to an enormous controversy at the founding of the AEA
that helped define the fault lines between the "new school" and the orthodox political
economists. For more on the founding of the AEA, see generally ROSS, supra note 17, at 110-12;
A.W. Coats, The American Economic Association and the Economics Profession, 23 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1697 (1985). In contrast to Coats and Ross, Thomas Haskell has argued that the
AEA, as the locus of new school reformism, was first and foremost a professional organization and
not a vehicle for social change, HASKELL, supra note 17, at 187-88.
71. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42
STAN, L. REV. 993 (1990); BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE:
ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998).
72. See infra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
73. A.W. Coats, Henry Carter Adams: A Case Study in the Emergence of die Social Sciences in the
United States, 1850-1900, 2 J. AM. STUD. 177 (1968); 3 DORFMAN, supra note 41, at 164-74;
Joseph Dorfman, Introduction to TWO ESSAYS BY HENRY CARTER ADAMS (Joseph Dorfman ed.,
2d ed. 1969). For a complete bibliography of Adams's publications, see S. Laurence Bigelow et al., Henry
Carter Adams, 30 J. POL. ECON. 201-11 (1922).
74. Marvin B. Rosenberry, Henry Carter Adams, 16 I.C.C. PRAC. J. 10, 19-21 (1948).
75. ELY, supra note 70, at 172-73 (1938); RICHARD T. ELY, TAXATION IN AMERICAN
STATES AND CITIES (1888); JOHN PRENTISS POE & RICHARD T. ELY, REPORT OF THE TAX
COMMISSION OF BALTIMORE (Baltimore, King Bros. 1886).
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of Wisconsin faculty-where he spent the majority of his career-he began
focusing his energies more on labor economics and industrial relations."6
By contrast, Seligman, who spent nearly his entire adult life
associated with Columbia University, first as a student and then as a
faculty member, was committed throughout his career to the study of
taxation. He began his lifelong commitment to the American
"science of finance" with a series of articles in the late 1880s and
several significant tax treatises in the following decade; '" he ended his
career as "the leading tax expert of his time," with his life's work
spanning "the entire arc of tax reform theory." 9 As one of the editors
of the Columbia-sponsored Political Science Quarterly, and the editor
assigned to the topic of public finance for a Columbia Press book series,
Seligman became the de facto translator of continental texts on fiscal policy
early in his careens0 He would later recount to Wesley C. Mitchell, one of his
Columbia colleagues, that this "mere accident of departmental
organization" would lead to his lifelong commitment to the study of
taxation.8 ' To be sure, there were other thinkers who contributed to
the emerging American literature on public finance. But it was
Adams, Ely, and especially Seligman who were not only representative
of their generation of economic thinkers, but were also the pivotal
historical figures guiding the paradigm shift in tax theory.
76. ELY, supra note 70, at 190-94.
77. Seligman received his undergraduate education, his doctoral training, and a law degree
from Columbia University before joining the faculty of Political Economy. Franek Rozwadowski,
From Recitation Room to Research Seminar: Political Economy at Columbia University, in BREAKING
THE ACADEMIC MOULD: ECONOMISTS AND AMERICAN HIGHER LEARNING IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 196 (William J. Barber ed., 1982).
78. Seligman's first set of publications, ostensibly about taxation, focused on the railroads. See
Edwin R.A. Seligman, Railway Tariffs and Interstate Commerce Law, 2 POL. SCi. Q. 223 (1887);
Edwin R.A. Seligman, Railway Tariffs and Interstate Commerce Law II, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 369 (1887).
Defending the Interstate Commerce Commission in these articles, Seligman described how railroad
rates were similar to taxation and hence should be governed by the principle of "ability to pay"-the
notion that "a rich man ought to pay more than a poor man." Id. at 249.
79. HIGGENS-EVENSON, supra note 59, at 78.
80. Among the many books Seligman reviewed for the Political Science Quarterly, several
were by his German teachers. See Edwin R.A. Segliman, Book Review, 1 POL. SCI. Q. 143 (1886)
(reviewing GUSTAV COHN, SYSTEM DER NATIONALOKONOMIE (1885)); Edwin R.A. Segliman, Book
Review, 4 POL. SCI. Q. 543 (1889) (reviewing GUSTAV SCHMOLLER, ZUR LITTERATURGESCHICHTE
DER STAATS-UND SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN (1888)); Edwin R.A. Segliman, Book Review, 5 POL. SCI.
Q. 171 (1890) (reviewing ADOLPH WAGNER, FINANZWISSENSCHAFT (1889)).
81. Wesley C. Mitchell, Tribute, in EDWIN ROBERT ANDERSON SELIGMAN, 1861-1939, at
60 (1942); In Memoriam: Edwin Robert Anderson Seligman, 54 POL. SCI. Q. 480 (1939).
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A. Common Experiences
What united Adams, Ely, Seligman, and many of the other ethical or
proto- institutionalist economists were their personal backgrounds and their
experiences coming of age during the turbulent decades of the late nineteenth
century. Though Ely, Adams, and Seligman were each reared in rather
different environments, they all shared, at an early age, an interest in social
reform. Ely was raised in the agricultural region of upstate New York by a
family of ardent Presbyterians dedicated to egalitarianism and social
change, who had hoped that young Richard would one day join the minis-
try. 2 Similarly, Adams was born and raised in rural Iowa, the son of a
Congregational minister and abolitionist leader, who also aspired to mold
his son into a minister.S Seligman, by contrast, was the child of an affluent,
New York City German-Jewish family that was active in civic and social
reform organizations, such as Felix Adler's Society for Ethical Culture.8
If their upbringings inclined these three men toward social change,
their experiences with the harsh material realities of late nineteenth-
century American life fortified their reformist tendencies. Not only did the
forces of rapid industrialization and urbanization heighten the disparity of
wealth, the uneven development of modern American capitalism also
fueled class conflict and labor unrest during this period. The interchange of
radical labor protests and conservative reactions fueled the tensions of the
day. Tremendous industrial strikes, occasioned by periodic economic down-
turns, provoked anti-radical and anti-labor campaigns that heightened the
anxiety surrounding the question of the role of an autonomous labor
movement in an industrialized democracy. In 1886 alone, there were
82. ELY, supra note 70, at 13-15; BENJAMIN 0. RADER, THE ACADEMIC MIND AND
REFORM: THE INFLUENCE OF RICHARD T. ELY IN AMERICAN LIFE 2-6 (1966).
83. Coats, supra note 73, at 179-80; Dorfman, supra note 73, at 9.
84. William Weisberger, Seligman, Joseph, 19 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, 623-25
(John A. Garraty & Mark C. Carnes eds., 1999). Historians of economic thought have written at
great length about how this generation of political economists, including Ely, Adams, and
Seligman, were united by a religious fervor for social reform. But while all three of these thinkers
were brought up in an environment where religion was important-for Ely and Adams, the
evangelicalism of Protestantism, and for Seligman, reformed Judaism-they also shared the
common trait of turning their backs on the religious zeal of their families. Ely and Adams
attempted, but eventually gave up on, careers in the ministry, and Seligman turned his back on
Judaism at a relatively early age. FURNER, supra note 17, at 49-56; ROSS, supa note 17, 102-04.
According to his son, Eustace, Edwin Seligman had "broken with Judaism psychologically, intellectually
and every other way" relatively early in his life. Interview with Eustace Seligman for the Columbia
University Oral History Collections (Sept. 3, 1974) (on file with Butler Library, Columbia University).
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approximately 1500 strikes; none was better known than the one leading to
the Haymarket Riot and the subsequent backlash against the labor movement.85
The public salience of the "labor question" was not lost on these budding
academics. After searching for work on the streets of New York, Ely resolved
as early as 1880 to become an advocate for the working class. 6 When Adams
began his graduate training at Johns Hopkins, he was struck, as he walked the
streets of Baltimore, by the extent of urban poverty." Although Seligman
was the scion of a prestigious banking family, he was empathetic to the needs
and wants of trade unionism, as his early scholarship on the cooperative
movement and Christian socialists suggested.88 Indeed, nearly this entire
generation of American academics struggled with the longstanding dilemma
of attempting to "bridge the world of educated opinion and that of the working
masses."89 For those who became interested in public finance, the distribution of
fiscal burdens was an ideal topic to help bridge the chasm between highbrow
theories and the material world of the masses.
B. The German Influence
Above all else, what eventually united Ely, Adams, Seligman, and other
young progressive economists was their economic training in Germany.
Following the path of their American mentors, a whole host of aspiring
American academics made a sojourn to Germany to complete and often to
complement their graduate school training.' As one of the oldest of the
group, Ely helped initiate this transatlantic transfer of ideas and pedagogy.
He attended the University of Heidelberg, where he completed his doctorate
under the guidance of Karl Knies. Ely also brought the German seminar
model of teaching back to Johns Hopkins, where he began his teaching
85. See generally MELVYN DUBOFSKY, INDUSTRIALISM AND THE AMERICAN WORKER,
1865-1920 (1975); P.K. EDWARDS, STRIKES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1881-1974 (1981);
WALTER LICHT, INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1995); DAVID
MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR 2 (1987).
86. ELY, supra note 70, at 164-65; RADER, supra note 82, at 16; ROSS, supra note 17, at 105.
87. Ross, supra note 17, at 105; Letter from Henry C. Adams to Mother (Oct. 22, 1876),
Correspondence Jan.-June 1878, Box 1, Henry Carter Adams Papers (on file with Bentley
Historical Library, University of Michigan).
88. Edwin R.A. Seligman, Owen and the Christian Socialists, 1 POL. Sci. Q. 206 (1886).
89. LEON FINK, PROGRESSIVE INTELLECTUALS AND THE DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRATIC
COMMITMENT (1997).
90. See generally JURGEN HERBST, THE GERMAN HISTORICAL SCHOOL IN AMERICAN
SCHOLARSHIP: A STUDY IN THE TRANSFER OF CULTURE (1965); RODGERS, supra note 13, at 76-
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career. Adams, who received one of the first doctorates granted by an
American university (Johns Hopkins), also completed his graduate studies
at Heidelberg as well as the University of Berlin, where he studied with
Adolph Wagner, one of Germany's leading authorities on public finance.92
Seligman, who had family ties in Germany and often visited Europe during
his childhood, also studied in Heidelberg and Berlin, under the tutelage of
Wagner, Gustav Schmoller, and other well-known German economists.9'
This shared intellectual connection to Germany was more than just a
coincidence. Unlike some of their more conservative colleagues who also
studied in Germany," Ely, Adams, Seligman, and many of the other members
of the new school were deeply indebted to their German training. The more
radical American students, in fact, became great admirers of the scholars who
made up the German Historical School of Economics. Ely, Adams, and
Seligman each studied under some of these leading German scholars.
Seligman, who had the greatest affinity for German culture, maintained
a substantive correspondence with his teachers long after his days as a student."
Historians of economic thought have disagreed as to the coherency and
legitimacy of the so-called German Historical School of Economics. They
have questioned whether it was really a "school of thought," whether it was,
in fact, "historical," and even whether it was truly "German."96 Still, most
commentators agree that German academics such as Wilhelm Roscher,
Gustav Schmoller, Karl Knies, and Adolph Wagner-to name only a few-
coalesced as a group of intellectuals during the second half of the nineteenth
century who came to question the metaphysical laws of classical political
91. ELY, supra note 70, at 41-47; RADER, supra note 82, at 18; William J. Barber, Political
Economy in the Flagship of Postgraduate Studies: The Johns Hopkins University, in BREAKING THE
ACADEMIC MOULD: ECONOMISTS AND AMERICAN HIGHER LEARNING IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY, supra note 77, at 203, 209-10.
92. RODGERS, supra note 13, at 96-97; Barber, supra note 91, at 207-08; Dorfman, supra
note 73, at 11.
93. Carl S. Shoup, Edwin R.A. Seligman, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 163 (David L. Sills ed., 1968); Rozwadowski, supra note 77, at 196.
94. Arthur Hadley and F.W. Taussig, two conservative contemporaries of the new school
economists, also studied in Germany but came away from their experiences with a very different
attitude towards historicism. FURNER, supra note 17, at 54-55.
95. HERBST, supra note 90, at 134-35, 213; RODGERS, suprra note 13, at 76-111; Dorfman, supra
note 90; Notebooks from Classes in Berlin, Box #86, Lecture Notes Taken By Edwin R.A.
Seligman, Edwin R.A. Seligman Papers (on file with Butler Library, Columbia University);
Cataloged Correspondences with Gustav Schmoller and Adolph Wagner, Edwin R.A. Seligman
Papers (on file with Butler Library, Columbia University).
96. Heath Pearson, Was There Really a German Historical School of Economics?, 31 HIST.
POL. ECON. 547 (1999); Dorfman, supra note 90, at 17-28; HERBST, supra note 90, at 130; JOSEPH
A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 808-14 (1954).
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economy. Led by Roscher, who in the 1840s began the assault on deductive,
a priori systems of economic thought, the subsequent generation of German
academics contended that universal economic laws were incoherent outside
of their social, political, and economic context."
Like the German school of jurisprudence, which Roscher explicitly sought
to emulate, the German historical economists believed that human societies
were not governed by natural laws. Instead, Roscher and his colleagues
contended that social and economic relations were contingent upon historical
and institutional contexts. These scholars used the term "historical" in its
broadest sense to highlight not only the significance of the past, but to
renounce generalizing theories in favor of a fidelity to the particularity of actual
events.98 Similarly, they used the term "institution" to refer to a broad category
of norms and other socially created constraints on human behavior. From this
vantage point, scholars such as Schmoller critiqued the tenets of classical and
neoclassical economic theory, and took a normative position on the role of the
state in guiding the economy and society. In contrast to the laissez-faire
commitment of classical theory, the German historical economists argued that
the increasing complexity and interdependence of modem society required a
changing and more active role for the positive state.'
It was this methodological emphasis on contingency, and the normative
appeal to state action, that had the greatest influence on the young American
political economists trained at the foot of the German Historical School. As
historians have chronicled, many of the American scholars who traveled to
Germany in the last decades of the nineteenth century came back to the
United States with a more radical and fervent desire for reform."w In their role
as academics, these progressive intellectuals adopted the pedagogical seminar
style of the German universities and absorbed the substantive lessons of their
German teachers. In the process, they helped forge not only a new view of
economics, but a distinct form of American new liberalism that advocated
using the powers of the state to address the numerous social dislocations of
modem industrial society9
97. RODGERs, supra note 13, at 90-95; 3 DORFMAN, supra note 41, at 131-34; SCHUMPETER,
supra note 96, at 807-09.
98. Pearson, sapra note 96, at 548-49.
99. FuRNER, supra note 17, at 48-49; RODGERS, supra note 13, at 76-111; ROSS, supra note
17, at 98-140. Other scholars, by contrast, have depicted the German historical school as a
"coherent conservative critique of laissez-faire" that sought to perpetuate "patriarchy and absolutism
as the best possible legal, political, and social shell for a capitalism without class struggle." GOSTA
ESPINO-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 10 (1990).
100. RODGERS, supra note 13, at 76-111.
101. For more on American new liberalism, see sources cited supra note 13.
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Nowhere was the influence of German historicism on American new
liberalism more apparent than among those American scholars who were
interested in fiscal policy. Ely, Adams, and Seligman, in particular,
returned from their postgraduate experiences in Germany with a serious
interest in understanding pubic finance, or what their German teachers
referred to as Finanzwissenschaft, the "Science of Finance." Having read
Schmoller's historical tracts and Wagner's calls for the need for a redistribu-
tive tax policy, Ely, Adams, and Seligman began to lay the intellectual
foundations of American public finance theory. But first they had to
translate the general philosophy of the German Historical School for an
American audience. In keeping with the historicism they learned from
their German mentors, these aspiring public finance economists attempted
to graft continental ideas onto the stock of Anglo American thought; they
sought, in other words, to make German economic theories congruent with
modem American institutions and culture.
C. From Berlin to Baltimore: Transplanting German Ideas Onto
American Soil
When he began teaching at Johns Hopkins, Ely became one of the first
Americans to import the economic ideas of his German teachers to the
United States. He identified the German Historical School as the model
for the American new school of heterodox economists. Although he was
careful not to dismiss completely the contributions of Adam Smith and the
classical political economists, Ely described their ideas as outdated and pro-
claimed that a more scientific method, one that emphasized a historical and
institutional approach, was now carrying the day. 2
Other new school economists soon followed Ely's lead. In one of his
first published essays, Seligman claimed that German scholars such as
Roscher, Knies, and Hildebrand were the first thinkers to place economic
ideas within a "truly scientific basis" by proclaiming "the necessity of treating
economics from the historical stand-point."'0 '  Seligman contended that it
was these German thinkers, and now their American counterparts in the new
school, who discarded "the exclusive use of deductive method" and called for
the "necessity of historical and statistical treatment."'O' It was they who
102. Richard T. Ely, The Past and the Present of Political Economy, 2 OVERLAND MONTHLY
225 (2d ser. 1883).
103. Edwin R.A. Seligman, Change in the Tenets of Political Economy With Time, 7 SCIENCE
375,381 (1886).
104. Id.
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denied "the existence of immutable natural laws in economics, calling
attention to the interdependence of theories and institutions, and showing
that different epochs or countries require different systems."' 5 It was the
German Historical School, Seligman continued, that abandoned any "belief
in the beneficence of the absolute laissez-faire system," and maintained "the
closer interrelation of law, ethics, and economics," while refusing to accept
"the assumption of self-interest as the sole regulator of economic action.' 1 6
Finally, and most importantly for Seligman, the new school shared with its
German counterpart the need to address contemporary problems. Once it
was free from the reigning orthodoxy of laissez-faire, "the new school,
devoid of all prepossessions, devoted itself to the task of grappling with the
problems which the age had brought with it."1"7 These were the main
principles, Seligman argued, that their German mentors had bequeathed to
the new school of American political economy.108
The American new school was not, however, a simple imitation of
German historical economics; suggesting that it was would belie the true
lessons of historicism. Both schools of thought were rather a function of
historically specific social and economic conditions. Thus, the message of the
German Historical School was a manifestation of an industrial era.
Similarly, Seligman explained, "[t]he new school is the product of the age, of
the zeitgeist, not of any particular country; for the underlying evolutionary
thoughts of a generation sweep resistlessly throughout all countries whose
social conditions are ripe for change."'" Even English economists-those most
ardent supporters of timeless economic and legal doctrines-Seligman
argued, could not resist the force of the zeitgeist. John Stuart Mill "himself
had gone through an evolution and was sincere enough to express his dis-
belief in the old economy, and to a certain extent in his own book."' 10 This
commitment to the relativity of economic and legal doctrines-a commit-
ment that Ely, Adams, and Seligman acquired mainly during their German
education-became an essential part of their overall fiscal vision.'1
While Ely and Seligman embraced the process of transplanting
German ideas onto American soil, others had a more tempered response.
Adams, for instance, had always been skeptical of some of the more radical
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 382.
110. Id. at 381.
111. Id.
proposals of the German socialists, such as the idea that "all the children shall
be brought up by the state.""' Writing to his mother during his time in
Germany, Adams described such proposals as "a dream of a new creation in
which the nature of man as well as social organization must be entirely
remodeled."'' Such a communal view of society "cannot exist and spread in
America," wrote Adams, "because we love our homes to [sic] much. Men are
too exclusive in their habits to want commonality in everything.""' 4 Adams,
more so than some of his new school colleagues, understood the institutional
constraints posed by American political culture. In this way, he was more
consistent in self-reflexively applying historicism to his own particular context.
Yet while Adams may have harbored some reservations about the
reception of social democratic ideas by American culture, he was by no
means an apologist for capital. On the contrary, during the labor turmoil of
the Gilded Age, Adams, along with many of his new school colleagues, was
an adamant supporter of the American labor movement and its calls for
greater equality in industrial relations. For a younger, rebellious generation
of thinkers, however, such support often came at a price. Adams's academic
career, for instance, was dealt a serious setback in 1886 when his employ-
ment contract with Cornell was not renewed because of his public com-
ments suggesting that labor deserved "proprietary rights" in industrial
capital."' Coming on the heels of one of the most violent years of labor
strife, when many Americans feared the rising tide of socialism, Adams's
comments were interpreted by prominent Cornell alumni and administra-
tors as unequivocal support for labor's "crusade against capital.""6 Adams
112. Letter from Henry C. Adams to Mother (Aug. 4, 1878), Correspondence Jan.-June
1876, Box 1, Henry Carter Adams Papers, (on file with Bentley Historical Library, University of
Michigan) (copy on file with author).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Henry C. Adams, The Labor Problem, Sci. AM. SUPPLEMENT, Aug. 21, 1886, at 8861-
63; FURNER, supra note 17, at 133-38.
116. Rosenberry, supra note 74, at 27; Dorfman, supra note 73, at 36. It appears that Adams
did not believe that his public comments at Cornell were cause for concern. As late as the fall of
1886, many months after his public comments, Adams wrote Seligman about the controversy
stating that he did not "have any reason to apprehend difficulty." Letter from Henry C. Adams
to Edwin R.A. Seligman (Nov. 9, 1886), quoted in Joseph Dorfman, The Seligman Correspondence II,
56 POL. ScI. Q. 270, 270 (1941). Nevertheless, Adams did request that Seligman publish a
positive review of Adams's Outline of Lectures on Political Economy in the next issue of the Political
Science Quarterly, as a safeguard against the possibility of dismissal from Cornell. Letter from
Henry C. Adams to Edwin R.A. Seligman (Nov, 17, 1886), quoted in Dorfman, supra, at 270-71.
Seligman complied by having their mutual friend Edmund James review the text. James's
favorable review emphasized the "conservative nature" of Adams's work. Edmund J. James, Book
Review, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 186, 188 (1887) (reviewing HENRY CARTER ADAMS, OUTLINE OF
LECTURES UPON POLITICAL ECONOMY (1886)).
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was able, ultimately, to secure a position at the University of Michigan after
assuring administrators there that he was no socialist."7 Still, Adams's
encounter with the political constraints on academic freedom colored much
of his subsequent scholarship and informed his generation of American
social scientists about the limits of academic freedom."s
In this regard, Adams was not alone. Ely and several other reform-minded
economists faced similar political pressures during the 1890s." 9 Indeed,
defining the limits of academic freedom became an essential part of the
professionalization process.2 Forced to realize that American professors did
not enjoy the same intellectual liberty or political support as their German
counterparts, the new school economists learned to temper their views on
controversial issues. After his ordeal at Cornell, Adams, for instance, began to
couch his otherwise more daring pronouncements on law and political
economy with an appeal to "English liberty" and the long established
cultural values of American institutions."' Surely, these collisions with
political power during the early stages of the professionalization of the social
sciences tempered nearly every aspect of the economists' theories, including
their views on public finance. While it is doubtful that Ely, Seligman, or
Adams wholly embraced the radically redistributive tax theories of their
German mentors, any sympathy they may have had was certainly
diminished after they witnessed firsthand how American society responded
to academic support for anything remotely resembling socialism.
D. Drawing on the Undifferentiated Tradition of Benefits
and Faculty Theories
When these German-trained public finance economists set out to con-
struct the theoretical blueprints for the new fiscal polity, they were able to
rely on a long tradition of tax principles. Neither the benefits principle nor
the notion of faculty was unique to the historical development of the
American income tax. Both of these doctrines had coexisted throughout
117. Dorfman, supra note 73, at 38.
118. FURNER, supra note 17, at 138-39.
119. Id. at 146-62; RADER, supra note 82, at 136-50.
120. FURNER, supra note 17, at 147-62.
121. Henry C. Adams, Discussion of the Interstate Commerce Act, 1 MICH. POL. Sci. ASS'N
PUBLICATIONS 137, 143 (1893). For more on academic freedom in the United States during the
late nineteenth century, see also WALTER P. METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE
UNIVERSITY (1955).
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the western world for centuries. 2 Frequently, the two were conflated into one
general justification for a diverse set of levies. Indeed, the coterminous
development of these disparate ideas over time shows how neither theory was
ever able to replace the other completely. The task of the progressive political
economists was thus two-fold. First, in the process of decoupling the two
doctrines, they needed to delineate the divergent social theories that
undergirded each of the two tax principles; and second, they needed to
demonstrate why a progressive income tax supported by the notion of faculty
was the historically legitimate form of taxation for a modem, industrial nation-
state. In seeking the first objective, economists at the turn of the century were
able to draw on a long, though often undifferentiated, intellectual tradition.
Although taxation has existed in one form or another since human
societies first began to mobilize and allocate resources, systematic and self-
conscious theories about taxation appear to be a more recent phenomenon."'
To be sure, the ancient Greeks and Romans had a diversity of levies, from
liturgical burdens to property taxes. Yet, these measures were often validated
by a commingling of theories. The liturgical duties and property taxes borne
by wealthy Athenians and Romans, for example, were viewed as both civic
obligations required of the aristocratic class and as payments for the
protection provided by the sovereign."'
Similarly, the medieval towns of Western Europe levied taxes based on
both the capacities or membership duties of individual citizens, as well as the
benefits they received from the government. The medieval property tax,
for instance, was premised on a dual set of principles: On the one hand,
taxes were based on social rank, determined by one's status in the feudal
system, which suggested that taxes were a function of the benefits bestowed by
the sovereign upon his subjects. On the other hand, the medieval "corporate
122. For a concise history of western tax theories, see generally HAROLD M. GROVES, TAX
PHILOSOPHERS: Two HUNDRED YEARS OF THOUGHT IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED
STATES (Donald J. Curran ed., 1974).
123. On the broad development of fiscal policies and structures in the west, see generally
MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE (1988); CAROLYN WEBBER & AARON WILDAVSKY, A
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124. MI. FINLEY, THE ANCIENT ECONOMY 152-54 (1973); Maureen B. Cavanaugh,
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A.H.M. JONES, ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 55-57 (1957). From roughly the third to the sixth
centuries, taxes throughout the Roman Empire were based mainly on the passive context of land
ownership, where property tax payments were deemed to be an indirect discharge of the emperor's
debts to the army and civil service, and thus a form of payment for government protection and
services; occasionally they were based on the active liturgical context, where taxes were a
requirement of citizenship. WALTER A. GOFFART, CAPUT AND COLONATE: TOWARDS A
HISTORY OF LATE ROMAN TAXATION, 105-06 (1974); see also A.H.M. JONES, THE LATER
ROMAN EMPIRE 284-602 A.D. (1964).
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levy," which was extracted from the urban freemen who lived outside the
feudal ranks, was premised on the obligations of membership in organizations
such as guilds or towns. Like the Greeks and Romans before them, medieval
subjects thus viewed taxation under a combination of guises.'
The process of analytically differentiating between the benefits and
faculty principles of taxation began with the seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century social contract theorists. From Hobbes and Locke to Grotius and
Pufendorf to Montesquieu and the Physiocrats, classical liberal thinkers
concerned primarily with defining the relations between state and society
started to privilege the benefits rationale. Locke succinctly summarized how
the benefits principle was fundamentally based on the state's role in protecting
private property: "[Elveryone who enjoys his share of the protection [of the
state] should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it.'
26
Montesquieu concurred: "The public revenues are a portion which each subject
gives of his property in order to secure and enjoy the remainder."'27
While the early Enlightenment witnessed the initial ascendancy of the
benefits theory, the two theories often remained undifferentiated. There
was perhaps no better example of this than Adam Smith's well known and
often-cited first maxim on taxation: "The subjects of every state ... ought
to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible
in proportion to their abilities, that is in proportion to the revenue which
they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state."'' 5  Subsequent
125. Dennis Hale, The Evolution of the Property Tax: A Study of the Relation Between Public
Finance and Political Theory, 47 J. POL. 382, 385-90 (1985). As a supplement to this source of
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Practice, 9 AM. ECON. ASS'N 7, 19 (1894).
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based on a fusion of benefits and faculty principles: "A common contribution is essential for the
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OF MAN AND CITIZEN art. 13 (1789) (France).
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political economists, most notably John Stuart Mill, departed from Smith's
conflation of the two theories to argue for a variant of the faculty theory, namely
that "equality of sacrifice"-measured in terms of diminished individual
utility-should be the touchstone for modem tax policies.'25 Still, for most
of the nineteenth century, tax policy discourse remained wedded to justifying
taxes in terms of both faculty and benefits.
Indeed, the continuous coexistence of these concepts over time illus-
trates how the history of ideas is seldom about the complete victory of one
concept over another. As the legal historian Neil Duxbury has noted, "Ideas-
along with values, attitudes and beliefs-tend to emerge and decline, and
sometimes they are revived and refined. But rarely do we see them born or
die. 1 3  Similarly, neither the benefits principle nor the faculty theory was
created or destroyed at the turn of the twentieth century.' Rather,
American tax theorists, building on the work of Mill, attempted to
delineate these rationales in an effort to reveal what they believed to be the
antiquated social theory underpinning the benefits principle.
American economists, however, did much more than just build on the
theories of classical British political economy. They extended the political
implications of these theories and adapted them to the historical conditions
of turn-of-the-century America-just as their historicist training had
taught. Whereas Mill and other British economists used the ability-to-pay
logic to support proportional consumption taxes, 132 American theorists
expanded the notions of social solidarity that they saw as the core of the ability-
to-pay principle. As a result, they contended that in an era of increasing
129. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 804 (William Ashley ed.,
1909) (1848); Utz, supra note 20, at 867. Mill wrote:
As, in the case of voluntary subscription for a purpose in which all are interested, all are
thought to have done their part fairly when each has contributed according to his means,
that is, has made an equal sacrifice for the common object; in like manner should this be
the principle of compulsory contributions: and it is superfluous to look for a more
ingenious or recondite ground to rest the principle upon.
MILL, supra, at 805.
130. NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 2-3 (1995).
131. Indeed, both benefits and faculty rationales continue to remain important for current,
twenty-first century tax policy discourse. See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 18; Dodge,
supra note 18; David G. Duff, Benefit Taxes & User Fees in Theory and Practice, 54 U. TORONTO
L.J 391 (2004).
132. Mill reasoned that, for administrative reasons, capturing a citizen's ability to pay with
an income tax could not be "estimated with any approach to fairness by a tax-collector." MILL, supra
note 129, at 830. Similarly, he was skeptical that the scale of graduated rates was "capable of being
decided with that degree of certainty on which a legislator or a financier ought to act." Id. at 807;
see also HENRY SIDGWICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Book 111, ch. VIII, § 7 (3d ed.
1901) (1883).
concentrations of wealth, moderately graduated income taxes were the best
way to capture a citizen's tax-paying capacity. While Mill employed radical
ideas for a generally conservative agenda,' his American disciples
acknowledged that they were using traditional principles for a much less
conservative approach. By using a form of historicism to demonstrate why
faculty doctrine should be privileged above benefits, the progressive
economists were attempting to lay the foundation for a seismic shift in
American economic and legal thought-a shift they hoped would support
the emergence of more transparent and equitable forms of taxation.
E. Applying the New Political Economy to Tax Policy
In using their historicist approach to mold the legacy of Anglo
American thinking about taxation, these American economists were oper-
ating on relatively new ground. During most of the nineteenth century, there
was little scholarly discussion in the United States about the general
economic principles of taxation beyond the politically controversial tariff.'
The taxing powers of state and local governments in the United States were, of
course, necessary to promote a "well-regulated" society, '3 and state and local sales
and property taxes were topics of discussion among some social commentators.
1 36
Yet, few contemporary scholars considered the political and economic power
that lay behind the federal government's ability to levy taxes. As late as 1880,
Francis A. Walker, Adams's mentor at Johns Hopkins and a leading authority
on political economy, could confidently claim, "The body of English literature
in finance is shabby in the extreme."'3 7 The main explanation for the "feeble-
ness and emptiness of the English literature in this department," Walker
explained, was the lack of serious scholarly attention given to taxation.
"Most of our political economists have not dealt with the subject at all, or have
done so very perfunctorily."'
3 9
The young, reform-minded economists set out to change all that.
Proceeding from different intellectual origins, Adams, Ely, and Seligman
133. GROVES, supra note 122, at 38.
134. As Henry Carter Adams noted, one of the tasks of his generation of academics was to
teach students "that there is more in Polit. Economy than the mere discussion of Free Trade and
Protection." FURNER, supra note 17, at 130.
135. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996). For more on the politically charged nature of the
tariff, see BENSEL, supra note 8.
136. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 53, at 113-15.
137. Francis A. Walker, The Principles of Taxation, 2 PRINCETON REV. 92, 93-94 (1880).
138. Id. at 93.
139. Id. at 92.
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began the American engagement with the "science of finance." They did
so by applying the historicism of the new political economy to public
finance issues such as the tariff, public debts, and of course the income tax.
As one of the elder members of this new generation of thinkers, Adams ini-
tiated the scholarly engagement with fiscal policy. His doctoral dissertation
was a historical analysis of the protective tariff, and his early treatises
focused on public debts and the budgetmaking process.'40 In his disserta-
tion, Adams illustrated how political pressures during the early years of the
republic-namely the need to respond to Britain's attempts to curtail the naval
powers of the United States-transformed the tariff from a simple revenue-
generating instrument into a protectionist tool to combat British naval
imperialism. This early manipulation of tax policy, Adams argued, led
directly to the late nineteenth-century abuse of the tariff to protect domestic
industry. Adams's normative message seemed clear: He wanted to ensure
that "tariff reform means tariff for revenue only.'' From the start, then,
Adams was attempting to use his public finance scholarship to affect the
making of tax policy. This desire to influence policymaking continued with
Adams's subsequent treatises on public finance.
Tariff reform was only one of the areas of fiscal policymaking that
attracted the attention of the progressive economists. In fact, redirecting
tariff policy was just one step in their agenda for an income tax. The more
important task was to apply a form of historicist political economy to the
underlying principles of taxation. In criticizing the benefits theory, Ely,
Adams, and Seligman singled out the anachronistic political implications of
this principle. Citing to the work of the jurist Thomas Cooley, who like
Adam Smith before him had conflated the benefits and faculty theories, Ely
claimed that taxes could not be justified based on "the old fiction of recip-
rocity."'42 In defining "taxes," Ely was careful in explaining that they were
"not exchanges" or "payments" for public goods and services.' "The sovereign
power demands contributions from citizens regardless of the value of any services
which it may perform for the citizen," Ely wrote.'" In contrast to Montesquieu's
140. HENRY C. ADAMS, PUBLIC DEBTS: AN ESSAY IN THE SCIENCE OF FINANCE (1887);
HENRY C. ADAMS, THE SCIENCE OF FINANCE: AN INVESTIGATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES
AND PUBLIC REVENUES (1898) [hereinafter ADAMS, SCIENCE OF FINANCE]. Even though one of
the aims of Public Debts was to advance the study of public finance in the United States, the
treatise gained an international audience and was even translated into Japanese.
141. HENRY C. ADAMS, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1816, at 79 (1884).
142. ELY, supra note 75, at 14.
143. Id. at 13.
144. Id. at 7.
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well-known tax definition, 45 Ely claimed that his own designation clearly
abandoned "the old legal fiction that taxes are paid for protection.""'4  This
antiquated defense for taxation was "so palpable an absurdity that it is strange
that it could ever have gained the currency which it now enjoys.",47
Adams echoed Ely's sentiments. The classical benefits theory, Adams
wrote, ignored how "[t]he modern State ... assumes duties far beyond the
primitive functions of protection to life and property.""'4 While such a "quid
pro quo theory of taxation may have served fairly well under conceptions of
governmental activity held in the early part of the century," Adams intoned,
"it must be regarded at present as somewhat antiquated."4 '
Seligman went even further in condemning the social theory that but-
tressed the benefits principle. He argued that the benefits doctrine was
based, at its core, on an outmoded conception of modem citizenship:
It is now generally agreed that we pay taxes not because the state
protects us, or because we get any benefits from the state, but simply
because the state is a part of us. The duty of supporting and protecting
it is born with us. In a civilized society the state is as necessary to the
individual as the air he breathes; unless he reverts to stateless savagery
and anarchy he cannot live beyond its confines. His every action is
conditioned by the fact of its existence. He does not choose the state, but
is born into it; it is interwoven with the very fibers of his being; nay, in
the last resort, he gives to it his very life. To say that he supports the
state only because it benefits him is a narrow and selfish doctrine. We
pay taxes not because we get benefits from the state, but because it is as
much our duty to support the state as to support ourselves or our
family; because, in short, the state is an integral part of us. 50
If there were any doubts where Seligman stood in regards to the benefits
principle, these striking words laid such doubts to rest.
Progressive economists also disapproved of benefits doctrine because it
was framed in an idiom of market relations. With their emphasis on the impor-
tance of ethical duty and social bonds, these theorists loathed how the
benefits doctrine commodified the relationship between citizens and the
145. See text accompanying notes 126-128.
146. ELY, supra note 75, at 7.
147. Id. Ely defined taxes simply as "one-sided transfers of economic goods or services
demanded of the citizens ... by the constituted authorities of the land, for meeting the expenses
of government, or for some other purpose, with the intention that a common burden shall be
maintained by common contributions or sacrifices." Id. at 6-7 (emphasis omitted).
148. ADAMS, SCIENCE OF FINANCE, supra note 140, at 300.
149. Id.
150. EDWIN R.A. SEIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 72 (1895).
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state. Taxes "are one-sided transfers of goods or services, and are not
mutual," Ely emphasized.'51 "The citizen pays because he is a citizen, and it
is his duty as a citizen to do so. It is one of the consequences which flow
from the fact that he is a member of organized society.... Only an anarchist
can take any other view."'52 If citizens were part of a greater whole, taxation
based on a notion of exchange or barter seemed wholly out of place. In
sum, the progressive economists saw the benefits doctrine as a misrepresenta-
tion of the social obligations of citizenship.'
5 3
When it came to applying the benefits theory to the structure of a tax
system-to the issue of whether the wealthy should pay more than the
poor-the progressive economists argued that the benefits principle was
intrinsically incoherent. The "give-and-take theory," as Seligman called it,
left the issue of degrees of taxation "inconclusive."'5 4 In his 1894 treatise on
progressive taxation, Seligman illustrated how advocates of the benefits
principle could use this theory to defend both a progressive tax as well as a
regressive one. Because "most of the public expenses are incurred to protect
the rich against the poor," Seligman coyly noted, the benefits theory would
dictate that "the rich ought to contribute not only actually, but relatively
more." 55 Thus, if the justification for taxation under the benefits doctrine
was the protection of private property, those with more property had more
to protect and hence ought to have a larger tax burden.
Yet at the same time, proponents of the benefits theory could also
demonstrate that "the very reverse is true.""6 Because "the millionaire who
is able to hire his own watchmen, his own detectives, his own military
guard, and who often relies more on his individual efforts than on the gov-
ernment for the protection of his property causes the state less expense than
the man of smaller means who must depend entirely on the government,"
151. ELY, supra note 75, at 13.
152. Id.
153. More recently, political philosophers and legal scholars have made a similar claim
about taxation, rights, and the social obligations of citizenship. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN
& ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999); STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999); MURPHY &
NAGEL, supra note 18; LINDA KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN
AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1998).
154. Edwin R.A. Seligman, Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice, 9 PUBLICATIONS
AM. ECON. Ass'N 7,82 (1894).
155. Id. This treatise was based on some of Seligman's previously published work. See
Edwin R.A. Seligman, The Theory of Progressive Taxation, 8 PUBLICATIONS AM. ECON. ASS'N 52
(1893); Edwin R.A. Segliman, The Theory of Progressive Taxation, 8 POL. SCI. Q. 220 (1893)
[hereinafter Seligman, Theory of Progressive Taxation].
156. Seligman, supra note 154, at 83.
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wrote Seligman, taxes based on benefits could mean that "the poor man
should then pay relatively more than the rich man."'5 7 Even variants of the
benefits doctrine that viewed taxes in terms of "the cost of services to gov-
ernment," and not "the value of protection" granted to individuals, were for
Seligman "untenable.""'5  Benefits doctrine, however it was defined, was
"indefensible" because, as Seligman succinctly put it, "It is absolutely impos-
sible to apportion to any individual his exact particular share in the benefits of
governmental activity. The advantages are quantitatively immeasurable."" 9
To be sure, the faculty theory, as the progressive economists acknowl-
edged, had its own problems when it came to addressing the rate structure
of a practical tax system. Nonetheless, whereas proponents of ability to pay
could unambiguously support some form of a graduated rate structure, bene-
fits theory provided its advocates with an inconsistent rationale for setting
practical tax rates. Moreover, Seligman claimed that certain individual pay-
ments for particular government services did not even deserve to be called
taxes. He conceded that "some payments made by individuals for
particular" government services "should represent as nearly as possible the
cost of service to the government."'60 But these payments, Seligman con-
cluded, "are not taxes.' 6' They should be viewed, instead, merely as "fees or
tolls.' 62 This distinction was critical. It suggested that Seligman and his
like-minded colleagues still believed that the benefits theory had an impor-
tant, though subordinate, role to play in public finance discourse. There
was no other way to define a toll, a fee, or a special assessment accurately
without some reference to the benefits conferred by the state. 63 Yet when it
157. Id. at 83-84. Protection was not the only government benefit that the poor received in
greater proportion. Seligman described how nearly every aspect of state services could be seen as
inuring to the benefit of the poor more than the rich: "The rich man sends his children to private
schools and colleges, the poor man has his family educated in public schools," wrote Seligman. Id. at
83. "The rich man has his street swept by a hired laborer, the poor man has his cleaned at the
expense of the city." Id.
158. Id. at 85.
159. Id. Even the most libertarian of modem scholars have come to agree that taxation is
justified in defraying the cost of "public goods." See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM (1962); Richard Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World, in PHILOSOPHY AND LAW 49-74
(Jules L. Coleman & Ellen Frankel Paul eds., 1987).
160. Seligman, supra note 154, at 85-86.
161. Id. at 86.
162. Id.
163. See Seligman's contribution to the discussion in Edwin R.A. Seligman et al., Federal
Taxes Upon Income and Excess Profits-Discussion, 8 AM. ECON. REv. 36, 42-45 (1918). In
describing how the benefits theory supported special assessments, Seligman likely had in mind the
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century. For more on the role of special assessments in nineteenth-century urban public finance, see
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came to financing those public goods and services that were not divisible
within a community or at the individual level, the best justification for such
taxes was the criterion of ability to pay. Thus, according to Seligman, not
only was the benefits principle inconsistent in structuring tax rates, in the
end, it also failed to reflect the true meaning of a tax.
In countering the benefits notion, the progressive economists crafted
slightly different versions of the ability-to-pay rationale. Adams, who
believed in distinguishing between the theoretical justification for taxation
and the "lawyer's point of view,""6 relied on what he called a "contributory
theory of a tax."'65 A progressive income tax was justified under such a the-
ory because it embodied the ethical duty of social unity that citizens of a
community owed to each other and to the larger commonwealth. Unlike
the contending "purchase theory" or "benefit theory" of tax, which empha-
sized a solitary, atomistic, and consumeristic relationship between the citi-
zen-taxpayer and the state, Adams explained that a contributory theory was
based on "solidarity of social interest.'
16
In this context, Adams was careful in using "contribution" to connote
that taxes should be seen as part of the organic or collective nature of the state.
"[Contribution] implies that all the functions undertaken by the State are
such as minister to common wants, and in large measure to wants which
cannot be segregated or specialized to individuals or to classes," Adams
wrote. 67  "A sense of organic unity and of interdependence, and a con-
sciousness of common rights and common duties, go along with the idea of
contribution.' '6 8 Despite his brush with the political powers at Comell,' 69 Adams
continued to believe that American institutions and culture could allow for the
importance of social solidarity.
As Ely pointed out, the Massachusetts Tax Commission made a similar
point as early as 1875 about "the correct doctrine of taxation."' 7  The
Commission's final report, to which Ely approvingly cited, stated that "a
man is taxed not to pay the state for its expense in protecting him, and not
in any respect as a recompense to the state for any service in his behalf, but
164. ADAMS, SCIENCE OF FINANCE, supra note 140, at 293. Although it is unclear precisely
what Adams meant by this phrase, it is likely that he was contrasting the more empirical "lawyer's
point of view," or "law in action," with the more theoretical perception of "law on the books." Id.
165. Id. at 301.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
170. ELY, supra note 75, at 14 n.2 (quoting from THOMAS HILLS ET AL., REPORT OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION ON TAXATION (Boston, Wright & Potter 1875)).
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because his original relations to society require it."''7' Ely believed that
social cohesion, not any notion of radical individualism, justified taxation.
"All the enjoyments which a man can receive from his property come from
his connection with society," the Massachusetts report continued."' "Cut
off from all social relations a man's wealth would be useless to him. In fact,
there could be no such thing as wealth without society." '173
Seligman took a slightly different approach in promoting the faculty
theory. While he agreed with Adams and Ely that the social interdependence
occasioned by modem industrial capitalism had displaced the logic of
autonomous individualism, Seligman contended that the principle of faculty,
in one form or another, had been evolving for centuries.'74 As one of the
progressive economists most steeped in historical analysis-his treatises
were well known for their coverage of the historical development of tax
concepts-and as the theorist who popularized the notion of ability to
pay,"' Seligman believed that class dynamics were driving modem society
as a whole to recognize the importance of creating an equitable tax system
based on faculty.'76 "Amid the clashing of divergent interests and the
endeavor of each social class to roll off the burden of taxation on some
other class, we discern the slow and laborious growth of standards of justice in
taxation, and the attempt on the part of the community as a whole to real-
ize this justice," proclaimed Seligman.' 7 "The history of finance, in other
words, shows the evolution of the principle of faculty or ability to pay-the
principle that each individual should be held to help the state in proportion
to his ability to help himself."'' 5
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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F. An Early Salvo Against the Property Tax
When it came to applying the abstract ideas of faculty or ability to pay
to concrete conditions, the progressive economists turned first to any easy
target-the general property tax administered by state and local governments.
While this levy was one of the earliest forms of American taxation, by the late
nineteenth century it was garnering increased criticism from economic
commentators," 9 Not surprisingly, the progressive public finance economists
were at the forefront of the systematic analysis and evaluation of the property tax.
Ely was one of the first to investigate and empirically to discredit the
property tax. He approached the issue with an inductive method when he
was appointed as an economic expert to both the Baltimore and Maryland
Tax Commissions in the mid-1880s. In pioneering the empirical study of
municipal and state finance, Ely capitalized on his official position as a tax
commissioner to gather data on numerous North American cities and several
American states."' Ely was left appalled, from this work, by the "worthless"
system of state and local taxation that existed at the time. Struck by how
unfair the process of assessing property was in application, Ely dissented from
the Commission's rudimentary recommendations for more stringent
enforcement of the existing laws, and issued his own supplemental report
calling for a radical overhaul of the state and local systems of taxation.""
At about the same time that Ely was evaluating the Maryland and
Baltimore tax systems, Seligman was conducting his own international
study of property taxation. Although the two scholars were working inde-
pendently of one another, their evaluations of the general property tax were
remarkably consistent. Adams and other young economists joined the dia-
logue about the inadequacies of the property tax in an era of rising intangi-
ble wealth.182 Indeed, by the end of the nineteenth century, the property
tax had become the favorite whipping boy of nearly every economic
commentator. 183 But what set Ely and Seligman apart was how they applied
179. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 53; YEARLEY, supra note 55; TEAFORD, supra note 53.
180. ELY, supra note 70, at 173-74,
181. Richard T. Ely, Supplementary Report on Taxation in Maryland, in REPORT OF THE
MARYLAND TAX COMMISSION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 93-200 (Baltimore, King Bros.
1888); RADER, supra note 82, at 85-86.
182. ADAMS, SCIENCE OF FINANCE, supra note 140, at 489-506; Henry C_ Adams,
Suggestions for a System of Taxation, 2 MICH. POL. Sci. ASS'N PUBLICATIONS 60-61 (1894); see
also Charles J. Bullock, The Taxation of Intangible Property, in STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION:
SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE (Columbus, 1909); YEARLEY, supra note 54.
183. FISHER, supra note 53, at 122-41; YEARLEY, supra note 55, at 37-38; TEAFORD, supra
note 53, at 43-47.
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a guiding historicism to their analysis of the property tax. Their examina-
tions focused on how the property tax no longer corresponded to modem
industrial conditions-how the property tax, because of changing historical
conditions, no longer comported with what they saw as the touchstone of
modem taxation: the principle of ability to pay.
While the ownership of real property was at one time a fair representa-
tion of a citizen's tax-paying ability, the progressive economists believed
that with the rise of industrial capitalism, real property was no longer an
accurate measure of faculty. The institutional convergence of large-scale
manufacturing and finance capital at the turn of the century had profoundly
altered the social conceptions of property."8 4 The increasing prevalence of
intangible personal property, in the form of stocks, bonds, and other finan-
cial assets, allowed citizens to conceal their wealth in what contemporary
tax administrators referred to as "hidden assets." With real property no
longer being the primary marker of wealth and tax-paying ability, the progressive
economists believed that a tax on real property was insufficient in
accurately gauging a citizen's social obligations."'
In this context, the progressive economists claimed that an income tax
was highly superior to a tax on property, especially since the latter was, in
essence, simply a weak proxy for the former. The income tax "is the fairest tax
ever devised," Ely wrote in 1888 with some hyperbole, "it places a heavy
burden when and where there is strength to bear it, and lightens the load in
case of temporary or permanent weakness. Large property does not always
imply ability to pay taxes, as taxes should come from income; even when
assessed on property it is only an indirect device for estimating income.'
186
Why not remove the indirect device of taxing property, Ely reasoned, and take
a more direct approach at seizing one's ability to pay by imposing a state
income tax.
Two years later, Seligman provided a more detailed critique of the
property tax and its departure from the principle of ability to pay. In this
early salvo against the property tax, Seligman made three principal points.
First, he demonstrated that the property tax was not exceptional to American
conditions, as many commentators had claimed.' Second, because it was
not unique or timeless, the American property tax was susceptible to the
forces of historical change. Third, and perhaps most importantly, Seligman
184. See generally ROY, supra note 54, at 122-41; YEARLEY, supra note 55.
185. SELIGMAN, supra note 150, at 24; HIGGENS-EVENSoN, supra note 59, at 14.
186. ELY, supra note 75, at 288-89.
187. Edwin R.A. Seligman, The General Property Tax, 5 POL. Sci. Q. 24 (1890).
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illustrated how the property tax was now flawed "because property is no
longer a criterion of faculty or tax-paying ability."'' 8 With the changes in
economic conditions, Seligman asserted that "[t]he standard of ability has
been shifted from property to product.' ' 9  Put simply, Seligman, like Ely,
believed that the emergence of modem, industrial society meant that
wealth could no longer simply be equated with property: "Not the extent
but the productivity of wealth constitutes the test."'90 In other words,
revenue or the flow of wealth-not its mere physical embodiment-was the
true measure of one's ability to pay.
Finally, Ely and Seligman denounced the general property tax on
administrative grounds. It was a levy that could not be effectively collected,
they argued, because it could not get at the increasing forms of intangible
wealth, and because "[iut puts a premium on dishonesty and debauches the
public conscience. 19. But most importantly, for Seligman, the property tax
was no longer practical because "[i]t presses hardest on those least able to
pay"-those who had their more limited assets largely in real property that
could not be concealed from the property tax rolls.'92 In light of these
problems, Seligman believed that the income tax was "infinitely superior in
practice."' 93 From all this, claimed Seligman with his characteristic zeal,
one could conclude that "the general property tax is so flagrantly
inequitable that its retention can be explained only through ignorance or
inertia. It is the cause of such crying injustice that its abolition must
become the battle cry of every statesman and reformer."'194
In addressing the problems of the property tax, the progressive econo-
mists advocated the innovative idea of separating the sources of state and
local government revenues. Ely and Seligman recommended that local
governments apply the property tax only on real estate, which could not be
easily hidden, and that state governments should rely on a graduated
income tax to fund their needs.'9 This notion of separating or segregating
revenue between state and local authorities became increasingly popular
188. Id. at 62.
189. Id.
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among tax experts. By the first decade of the twentieth century, the
National Tax Association (NTA), one of the leading organizations of academics
and government tax administrators interested in public finance, began
touting the need to "separate the sources of revenue.""19 Seligman, as an
active member of the NTA, was a critical catalyst in disseminating the
ideas of the economists to policymakers. Indeed, he presented a paper on
the issue of separating fiscal sources before the NTA.9 ' But Ely, Seligman,
and other economists took an even more active role in shaping state and
local tax laws.
As economic experts appointed to state tax commissions, the public
finance economists were able to ensure that their empirical studies and
reformist theories had lasting impact. For Ely and Seligman, that meant their
historicist thinking could guide the making of state tax laws. Working with
the Baltimore and Maryland Tax Commissions, Ely's recommendations did
not initially have much traction with lawmakers, but over time his ideas
about reforming state and local tax administration and separating the sources
of revenue did influence the tax laws of Maryland and other jurisdictions.'9"
Seligman had a more direct and immediate impact in New York.
Acting first as a special consultant to particular tax bills in 1899, Seligman
contributed his expertise on the creation of small, gap-filling tax laws, such
as the special franchise tax on local pipes, wires, and tracks. Within a decade,
however, he had become an important member of the state tax commission,
where he was able to guide the process of separating the sources of tax
revenue. As he proclaimed before the annual NTA conference, the Empire
State, with his assistance, had achieved full separation of revenues by
1908.199 By that time, the expenses of the state government were being
financed entirely through levies on corporations, while property taxes were
reserved solely for localities. When New York considered adopting a state-
level income tax, Seligman once again applied his knowledge and his status
as an economic expert to insure the adoption of New York's first income tax
law in 1917. 20
196. Lawson Purdy, Outne of a Model System of State and Local Taxation, 1 NTA PROCEEDINGS
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G. Historicizing the Income Tax
Discrediting the general property tax from a historicist perspective was a
rather easy task for the economists. The more difficult undertaking was to
show why a direct tax on income was more appropriate given the historical
conditions of modem American capitalism. While Ely, Adams, and Seligman
disagreed about how an income tax should be implemented, they remained
united in analyzing tax policies from a historically specific point of view.
As we have seen, Ely favored a state income tax over the property tax
because he believed the latter was simply an ersatz measure of a citizen's
ability to pay. The income tax, he explained, was "beneficial because it
places a heavy load only on strong shoulders."201 But it was not only his dis-
satisfaction with the effectiveness of the property tax that led him to support
an income tax. Ely also believed that a direct tax on income at both the
state and national level was particularly necessary at a time when con-
centrations of wealth were making certain citizens increasingly disengaged
from the political process. With the empirical studies of the growing dis-
parity of wealth undoubtedly in mind, Ely commented on how the excesses
of the Gilded Age occasioned "a considerable and increasing class living in
great comfort on incomes of large proportions... who by insurance and
various devices, protect themselves and their families for the future, and yet
pay no taxes." 202 Though Ely did not elaborate on how members of such a
leisure class could escape their fair share of taxes, he seemed to imply that
the wealthy were able to hold assets that could be concealed from the prop-
erty tax, and that because they had large incomes, the indirect excise taxes
and import duties were only a minor inconvenience.
Indeed, Ely seemed to argue that the opaque nature of indirect con-
sumption taxes was an obstacle to the promotion of good government. In
shirking their fiscal responsibilities, the citizens who made up this leisure
class, Ely claimed, were often "careless and indifferent about their public
duties, knowing that their income is not affected by high or low taxation.
They appear to pay nothing to government, and as it seems to cost them
nothing, they too often care little for it." ' In the absence of classical
republican notions of civic virtue, it was no surprise to Ely and others that
an indirect system of taxation only seemed to exacerbate the individual
indifference toward everyday functions of government.
201. ELY, supra note 75, at 288.
202. Id. at 289.
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The emerging leisure class was only part of the contemporary problem.
Even more disconcerting for Ely was the class of "professional people," the
"lawyers, physicians, and teachers," for example, who had "opportunities for
personal cultivation and for gathering knowledge," whose "influence ought to
be large and beneficial."20 4  As long as this new class of professionals and
managers was only tangentially affected by an indirect system of taxation, they
too would remain detached from practical politics. A direct tax on income, Ely
contended, was "precisely the kind of tax needed" to reengage citizens with the
political process and to promote good govemment.0 5 "It is beyond question,"
Ely concluded, that a fairly administered income tax "would change the
attitude of a large portion of the community towards government.,
20 6
Adams interpreted the historical circumstances of late nineteenth-century
America slightly differently. He acknowledged that industrial capitalism had
created a new leisure class, as well as a sector of society with personal wealth
rooted in professional salaries. But rather than wholeheartedly embrace an
income tax as a way to promote good government, Adams cautiously
questioned whether the monetary value of income was a sufficient "measure of
the relative ability of citizens to pay for the support of the State.""2 7 Given the
growing heterogeneity of income sources, Adams was skeptical that an income
tax could truly capture a citizen's ability to pay. He conceded that "[tihe chief
embarrassment which arises on account of the income tax lies in the difficulty
of obtaining the correct statement of income.
20 8
Writing in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 79 striking down the 1894 federal income tax, Adams was
restrained in supporting the income tax. Still, he concurred with his
progressive colleagues that ability to pay was the sound theoretical
foundation for a modem tax system. "Assuming the ability to pay to be the
just measure of payment," Adams intoned, "income is accepted as the surest
test of ability."2 ° He was skeptical, however, that in practice a direct tax on
income could accurately measure a citizen's taxpaying faculty. "The difficulty
of obtaining the correct statement of income," Adams noted, was aggravated
204. Id.
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by "the great variety of forms in which incomes exist." '' During a simpler
age, policymakers could be more confident that "incomes would be
homogenous" and a given tax would lead to "the same treatment applicable
to all."2 '2 But in a more modern, industrial world, "in society as it exists,"
wrote Adams in 1898, "incomes are not homogenous. They do not reflect
the same industrial conditions or measure with accuracy the energy
expended to secure them.""' Adams had 'in mind at least three different
kinds of income: "[I]ncome from services,"'.. 4 by which he referred to wages,
salaries, professional fees, and the like; "income from property,""' which
itself could be divided into income from land in the form of rent and
income from capital in the form of interest or profits; and finally, "income
of property," by which he meant wealth transfers at death."6
In illustrating how modern economic conditions made the implemen-
tation of an income tax more challenging, Adams was not betraying the
income tax movement or the faculty principle. Rather, he was seeking to
weave a progressive, individual income tax into his more systematic analysis
of public finance by relegating the income tax as a levy only on personal
service income.2 " In some ways, he was being even more consistent than
some of his colleagues in adhering to the principles of ability to pay. When
Adams raised objections to the exclusive use of income as a measure of tax-
paying capacity, he was doing so in order to show the limits of the income
tax in accurately measuring a taxpayer's faculty. Given that the various
sources of income "reflect diverse economic conditions and are subject to
varying economic tendencies," Adams concluded, "the amount of money
received during the twelve months is no satisfactory measure of the relative
ability of citizens to pay for the support of the state.""2 I Adams, it appears,
was not willing to settle for using the income tax alone as a metric for one's
taxpaying capacity. The income tax may have placed a "heavy load only on
strong shoulders,""' 9 to use Ely's vivid phrase, but that did not mean that
this was the only load that strong shoulders could bear.
211. Id. at 357.
212. Id.213. ld.
214. Id. at 357-58.
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Like Adams, Seligman also recognized the inadequacies of the income
tax. But whereas Adams appeared to be disillusioned with the limited reach
of the income tax in assessing tax-paying ability, Seligman accepted the
levy as a practical step toward the ideal of taxing one's ability to pay. In
this way, faculty or ability to pay was, for Seligman, an aspirational aim-an
ideal type that could not be achieved in practice, but that could be a useful
touchstone for policymakers. Given the changing historical conditions
wrought by industrial capitalism, the income tax was a necessary and feasi-
ble step for the reform-minded economists because it helped establish an
equitable distribution of tax burdens; it helped, as Seligman put it, to round
"out the existing tax system in the direction of greater justice." '
In the process of promoting tax laws and policies in the direction of
greater justice, Seligman applied a thorough-going historicism that set him
apart from his like-minded colleagues. Unlike Ely and Adams, who soon
turned their intellectual energies toward other issues, Seligman devoted his
entire academic career not only to the topic of public finance, but also to an
investigation of fiscal issues from a historical and comparative perspective.
If taxation was his first priority, international economic history was a close
second. He not only infused his tax treatises with discussions of historical
antecedents and transatlantic comparisons, he also wrote widely on the history
of economic thought. '2" In 1902, for example, Seligman published a rela-
tively popular monograph on the philosophy of history, modestly entitled
The Economic Interpretation of History."2
Seligman combined his interests in international economic history and
tax policy in charting the global development of the income tax. In one of
his best-known treatises, which was published in numerous editions and
translated into several languages, Seligman set out to demonstrate that an
urban industrial nation required a progressive income tax."3 Applying a crude
220. Edwin R.A. Seligman, The Income Tax, 9 POL. SCI. Q. 610,610 (1894).
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type of economic determinism, Seligman argued that theories of taxation
had evolved over the centuries to meet the changing functional needs of
society. What remained constant throughout this historical evolution was
the criterion used by the state to determine the basis of taxation. That
criterion, according to Seligman, was the principle of ability to pay.
Conveniently ignoring how his own historical research demonstrated
the longstanding coexistence of both the benefits and faculty theories,
Seligman claimed that a variety of different levies over time embodied the
faculty principle. The standard of faculty had undergone several manifesta-
tions from its origins in preliterate society to modem times, but it remained
the benchmark by which leaders were able to shape tax laws and policies.
Using an evolutionary theory of historical change reminiscent of Darwinian
gradualism, Seligman illustrated how different stages of economic develop-
ment led to different types of taxes embodying the ability-to-pay metric."'
More specifically, Seligman set out five phases in the historical devel-
opment of Western taxation, with the income tax as the fifth, and perhaps
final, stage of fiscal evolution. Each type of levy corresponded with a differ-
ent stage of political and economic development. First came the poll tax of
primitive societies; next, the real property tax of agrarian cultures; and
then, the indirect excise taxes of the early modem period. It was during the
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when the general property
tax became a "travesty of justice," '225 that European countries turned to con-
sumption taxes. This was the fourth stage of fiscal development, with
"expenditure as the criterion of faculty."22"6 But "with the growth of democracy,"
Seligman reasoned, "a system of taxation which inevitably results in undue
burdens on the less fortunate members of society was destined to become
unpopular and pass away. '227 Hence, in a variant of the fourth stage of
development, occurring prior to the industrial revolution, "tax reformers
and progressive governments reverted" to an alternative version of a
property tax, assessed on the produce or yield from property."' This tax
took the form of a levy on rental proceeds or a simple house tax-rather
than a tax on the value of property itself.2
While the move to a "produce" tax was deemed by Seligman to be "a
decided step forward" as "a test of faculty," it became insufficient when the
224. Id.
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226. Id. at 10.
227. Id. at 12.
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industrial revolution ushered in a new era of social and economic rela-
tions.230 This new stage of development was a time of immense wealth
disparities that required taxes to be graduated. As Seligman explained, "the
immense increase in modem wealth and the appearance of prodigious for-
tunes have contributed to bring into prominence the idea of graduated
taxation.""" Since taxes on the yield from property were, in effect,
intermediate steps at taxing the owners of wealth, and because individual
yields could be dispersed, a tax on the net produce of property could not be
progressively taxed.232 Hence, they "could not permanently respond to the
necessities of the situation." '233 It was the failings of previous tax regimes to
keep pace with changing historical conditions that occasioned the transition
to "the fifth and final stage" where "income was selected as the test of faculty. 234
Although Seligman claimed that the income tax was the "final" stage
in the development of tax laws, he went to great pains in his treatise to
emphasize that the income tax ought not be viewed as the only accurate
measure of tax-paying ability. The income tax, for him, was not without its
faults. It left many thorny questions unanswered, such as what constituted
income, whether all sources of income could be treated equally, and the all-
important issue of "whether different amounts of income present identically
the same criteria of ability to pay." ' In addition to these substantive ques-
tions, the income tax also posed a host of administrative concerns, not the
least of which was whether it could be executed without being overly intru-
sive.236 In the end, Seligman admitted that although a tax based on income
was perhaps the final stage of fiscal evolution, a system of taxation that
accurately gauged an individual's faculty would remain an ideal beyond the
reach of practical politics.
It was this pragmatic concession that compelled Seligman to apply his-
toricism, in a self-reflexive manner, to his own ideas. Seligman's theory of fiscal
evolution was therefore not a teleological one, with the income tax as some
sort of whiggish culmination of progress. He recognized that the income tax,
by itself, was no panacea for the complexities of a modem, industrial society.
230. Id. at 14.
231. Id. at 15.
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Pinning all his hopes on the income tax would only make him as
"unscientific" as the amateur economic commentators from whom he and
his new school colleagues sought to distance themselves. Instead, he saw
the income tax as a vital component in a larger matrix of policies
promoting economic and social justice-a component that remained tied to
the criteria of ability to pay. Seligman acknowledged the idealistic aspects
of his theory when he wrote:
While the system of taxation should endeavor, roughly at all events,
to adjust itself to income in general, the income tax as such can form
only a part, even though it may be a permanent part, of the system,
the other elements of which must be based upon the remaining criteria
of faculty in order to reach as close an approximation to justice as may
be possible. 37
Writing at a time when the future of the American income tax was
still unclear, Seligman and his colleagues did not lose sight of their histori-
cist methods. The income tax had come into its own as a necessary policy
for a modem, industrialized nation. But that did not mean the income tax
was or should be sacrosanct. For the progressive economists to give it such
timeless, transhistorical prominence would be to betray their own histori-
cism. Instead, because the income tax seemed to correspond with the level
of political and economic development that existed in turn-of-the-century
America, Seligman and his reformist colleagues became vocal advocates for
the implementation of a permanent federal income tax. Yet at the same
time, they recognized that conditions in other places and at other times
might dictate different forms of fiscal policies.
III. IDEAS, POLITICS, AND THE EARLY
DEVELOPMENT OF INCOME TAX LAWS
In their attempts to influence policymaking, the progressive economists
realized that the power of their ideas, alone, was often not enough to
change the laws and institutions that undergirded the American tax system.
They needed to take a more active role in the political and policymaking
process by participating as consultants and part-time tax commissioners,
and by capturing the attention of lawmakers. As the economists and other
social scientists were promoting their ideas, the American political system
itself was undergoing a radical transformation. For it was during the turn of
the twentieth century that the state of "courts and parties" was giving way
237. SELIGMAN, supra note 174, at 18.
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to a more fractured and pluralistic system of American politics. The nine-
teenth-century dominance of party politics and patronage was being eroded
by the rise of a more competitive political process, one that helped forge the
modem fiscal, regulatory, and administrative American state."' With this
shift in politics, reform-minded economists like Ely, Adams, and Seligman
joined organizations like the NTA and formed other coalitions, such as the
New York Tax Reform Association, to provide an outlet for their ideas-an
outlet that they hoped could shape tax policy more directly.
To meet the challenges of the emerging political system, the progressive
economists needed to defend their support for an income tax based on the
faculty principle against opposition from both the political right and left.
For political conservatives, wedded to a classical, night watchman view of
the state, the move to a graduated income tax was equated with creeping
socialism. The progressive economists observed firsthand, often to their
personal detriment, the overwhelming power that such conservative critics
held, particularly in delineating the bounds of academic freedom.239
Addressing these opponents, the progressive economists sought to demon-
strate that support for graduated income taxes could be compatible with
traditional American notions of equality and fairness.
The reform-minded economists faced a more amorphous, though equally
formidable, kind of opposition from the political left where the Populist
attraction to the single-tax ideas of Henry George appeared to distract
important constituencies away from the income tax movement. In defusing
this opposition, the economists sought to debunk the amateur economic
analysis conducted by George and his disciples. They also attempted to unmask
the "ultra-conservative" social theory that underpinned George's call for a
single tax on land.24° By navigating between these two political camps of
opposition-between the conservative critics who equated a progressive
income tax with socialism and the populist reformers who advanced a
seemingly more radical form of taxation-the progressive economists combined
their theories with other prevailing economic ideas of the times, namely
marginal utility analysis, to show that a progressive income tax was, in fact, an
assault on privilege that did not amount to a move toward state socialism.
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A. The Conservative Opposition to Income Taxes
From the political right, conservative commentators railed against the
income tax and the notion, in particular, of progressivity as a violation of the
natural laws of equality and uniformity. One of the most outspoken critics
was David A. Wells, the former commissioner of Internal Revenue during the
Civil War. As a popular writer during the late nineteenth century, Wells was
well known as a free-trader and an opponent of government intervention in
the economy." ' To be sure, Wells was no stranger to the importance of using
taxes to fund an army and build a nation. But he, like many of the old guard,
laissez-faire academics, was adamantly opposed to the use of progressive
income taxes. As early as 1880, when national lawmakers considered the
possibility of reviving the Civil War income tax, which had expired eight
years earlier, Wells spoke out against graduated income taxes. Except in the
extreme case of war, Wells argued that there was no place in a free republic
for any form of a graduated income tax based on the ability to pay.242
Nearly all income taxes in the western world had some sort of exemp-
tion level, and most had graduated rates. But for Wells, exemptions and
progressive rates spelled the worst sort of government discrimination. "Any
government, whatever name it may assume, is a despotism, and commits acts
of flagrant spoliation," Wells declared, "if it grants exemptions or exacts a
greater or lesser rate of tax from one man than from another.""2 3 As a former
federal tax official, Wells also believed that administering a permanent
national income tax was "impracticable." '244 But his most fundamental
objection, articulated in an 1880 article for the popular North American
Review, was that any discrimination in taxation was by definition "purely
arbitrary," and hence "an act of charity which every American ought to reject
upon principle and with scorn."24 Believing that progressive taxes of any sort
were a form of emasculating charity, Wells concluded that "[e]quality and
manhood, therefore, demand and require unifonnity of burden in whatever is
the subject of taxation.""24  Several years later, when the Pollock decision
241. See, e.g., David A. Wells, The Meaning of Revenue Reform, 113 N. AM. REV. 104
(1871); see also 3 DORFMAN, supra note 41; COHEN, supra note 13, at 88-95.
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began to act as a lightening rod for protests over the distribution of fiscal
burdens, Wells reiterated his opposition to a progressive income tax. '
Indeed, throughout his writings, Wells resisted any law that sought to alter
"the distribution of wealth by direct or indirect compulsion," or any
measure that "diminished the incentives for personal accumulation." '248
Although Wells did not specifically argue that taxation should be based solely on
the principle of benefits, his commitment to limited government and
unfettered individualism echoed the notion that taxes were only justified as
a price for the protection of private property.
Conservative hostility to the income tax was perhaps most vociferous
in the academy, where old guard defenders of classical political economy
joined Wells in denouncing progressive income taxes. At the time, there
was perhaps no greater academic proponent of the naturalness of classical
political economy than William Graham Sumner, a professor of political and
social science at Yale. Sumner was, of course, one of the traditional
political economists that the new school theorists singled out as an enemy
of reform.249 Like Wells, Sumner disparaged the protective tariff as a form of
state capitalism; he also believed that income taxes aimed at reallocating
fiscal burdens were an example of unnecessary state intervention in the
natural struggle for all "to get capital." The only thing that one could
expect from government was a minimal amount of protection of historically
based rights. This, of course, implied that citizens had only a limited respon-
sibility to pay for such protection."'
The comments of writers like Wells and Sumner were not mere rheto-
ric. Indeed, the conservative challenge to the income tax was most palpa-
ble within the institutions of power, particularly the judiciary. Justice
Stephen J. Field's concurring opinion in Pollock clearly illustrated how
many elite members of society viewed the progressive income tax as the first
step down a slippery slope toward class warfare. Referring to the mildly
247. David A. Wells, Is the Existing income Tax Unconstitutional? 19 FORUM 537 (1895).
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progressive rates of the 1894 income tax law,25' Field's concurring opinion
in Pollock articulated this growing anxiety. "The present assault on capital
is but the beginning," wrote Fields.252 "It will be but the stepping-stone to
others, larger and more sweeping, till our political contests will become a
war of the poor against the rich; a war constantly growing in intensity and
bitterness. 253  Whereas the progressive economists saw class tensions, exacer-
bated by the growing disparity of wealth, as the impetus for a more equitable
distribution of fiscal burdens, Fields and other supporters of laissez-faire
viewed this same tension in more millennial and catastrophic terms.
B. The Populist Opposition: Henry George's Single Tax
Although Wells, Sumner, and Fields were certainly not alone in either
opposing a progressive income tax, or in associating such levies with a gendered
view of masculinity, other more populist voices were not so reluctant to call
on the state's taxing powers to address the growing disparity of wealth in the
nation. But even these calls were a cause for concern among the reform-
minded economists. The most strident of these voices came from Henry
George, a journalist turned economic commentator, who tapped into the
American anti-monopoly tradition to propose his own type of fiscal solution
that was at odds with both the income tax and the principle of ability to pay.
In a hugely popular book, George advocated that the government
impose a levy only on increases in land values-a single tax on what
George referred to as the "unearned increment" of appreciated land. After
his book, Progress and Poverty, burst onto the scene in 1879, the popularity
of the tract led many social movements to take up the call for a single tax.254
And as early as 1885, Richard Ely observed that "tens of thousands of labor-
ers have read Progress and Poverty, who have never before looked between
the two covers of an economic book." '255 Throughout the 1880s and 1890s,
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and well into the early twentieth century, the single tax became a popular
social movement demanding a tax on land, specifically ground rent, as the
exclusive source for all government revenue."'
George's single tax on land was a simple, if not simplistic, idea aimed at
curbing land speculation and forestalling more radical attempts at tax reform.
Because George believed that land was the source of all wealth, he argued
that it should be taxed as common property. Combining such diverse sources
as the teachings of the Bible and Aristotle, George concluded that the
"unearned increment" on land came from the growth of populations-from
society itself-rather than individual effort, and thus the state had an
obligation to reclaim such unearned increment on behalf of society.257
The rhetoric of reclaiming the value created by society had a socialis-
tic ring to it. But George was no socialist. Instead, he held a rather conser-
vative view of individualism, arguing that the fruits of individual labor
belonged to the individual and that the state had very little role to play in
economic or social matters beyond levying a single tax on land. With a
severely circumscribed role for the state, George believed that there was little
need for any tax beyond one on the unearned increment of rent. It was
only the people's natural share in wealth that he sought to tax as revenue
for an otherwise limited government.
Though George's idea of using a single tax to address nearly all the ills
of modern capitalism caught on with many grassroots movements at the
turn of the century, it did not fit neatly into either of the predominant
views of governance. Neither the laissez-faire proponents who abhorred
almost any kind of tax, particularly one on land-the most sacrosanct of
private property-nor the advocates for a more robust positive state, could
see much merit in George's ideas. At its core, though, George's single tax
prescription appeared to be a narrow application of the benefits principle:
Landowners owed a duty to the state because it was the state that protected
the private property rights of landowners. This reciprocal relationship was
the essence of the benefits theory. Although George's ideas appealed to
many among the producing classes because of his populist appeals attacking
land speculators and monopolists, the single tax itself was premised on a
conservative, if not reactionary, view of individualism.
256. On the continuing popularity of the single tax movement, see generally ARTHUR P.
DUDDEN, JOSEPH FELS AND THE SINGLE TAX MOVEMENT (1971); ARTHUR N. YOUNG, THE
SINGLE TAX MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1916); Peter Speek, The Single Tax and the
Labor Movement (1915) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin).
257. GEORGE, supra note 254, at 299-394.
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Given George's commitment to individualism, it was no surprise that
socialists approached the single tax with a great deal of ambivalence. As Ely's
remark suggests, Progress and Poverty was wildly successful among the working
class."' 5 Nonetheless, many socialists saw the single tax for what it was: a
rearguard response to the changes wrought by industrial capitalism. Karl
Marx himself castigated George's bestselling book as "simply an attempt,
decked out with socialism, to save capitalist domination and indeed to establish
it afresh on an even wider basis than its present one."' 59 Socialists, in the end,
disagreed with the fundamental premise behind the single tax; whereas they
saw the eternal conflict of industrialism as a battle between labor and capital,
George seemed to counterpoise it as a struggle between labor and land.
While George's appeal among grassroots social movements became a
significant distraction for some supporters of the income tax,60 the rising
community of professional economists did not take his "unscientific" and
amateur analysis of economic conditions seriously. 61 For them, a more
potent intellectual challenge from the left came in the guise of their
German mentors who had been advocating for a more radically redistributive
form of taxation. Leading this charge was Adolph Wagner, the Berlin
economist with whom many of the progressive economists had studied
during their German sojourn. 6  Wagner's calls for using taxes to address
directly the vast inequalities in wealth had a far more receptive audience in
Germany than in the United States, where his American disciples were careful
and cautious in decoupling progressive income taxes from state socialism.
258. See text accompanying supra note 255.
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C. In Defense of Progressivity: Navigating Between the Opposition
Faced with these critiques from the political right and left, the reform-
minded economists attempted to navigate between these poles in advancing the
income tax cause. Challenging the ideas of their German mentors, the
progressive economists maintained-just as they had when they first introduced
German historicism to an American audience-that American political culture
posed some serious institutional constraints. Wagner's recommendations for
using steeply progressive income taxes to address the ills of industrial capitalism,
for example, were thus too radical for American ways.
New school economists admitted that their former instructor appropri-
ately identified the social aspects of fiscal policy-that taxes ought to be used
for much more than just government revenues. But they feared that Wagner'
and his socialist supporters promoted a level of state intervention that was
wholly distasteful to most Americans. Even Seligman, who discredited benefits
theory because it discounted the social connections between the individual and
the state, recoiled at the implication of Wagner's redistributive tax policies.
"From the principle that the state may modify its strict fiscal policy by considera-
tions of general national utility, to the principle that it is the duty of the state
to redress all inequalities of fortune among its private citizens, is a long and
dangerous step," Seligman warned."' "It would land us not only in socialism,
but practically in communism.
''
1
6
1
The fundamental problem for Seligman and his colleagues, then, was
that many commentators and old-guard political economists erroneously
assumed that "progressive taxation necessarily implies socialism and confis-
cation. 2 61 Citing explicitly to the work of David Wells, Seligman argued that
"[i]t is quite possible to repudiate absolutely the socialistic theory of
taxation and yet at the same time advocate progression. 2 6  Decoupling pro-
gressive income taxes from state socialism thus became one of the principal
aims of the reform-minded economists.
This was no easy task. As part of the professionalization process, many
of the young, reform-minded economists were forced to moderate their
more radical views in light of larger political pressures. Many social scien-
tists faced the harsh reality that the institutional powers behind the
American research university were not always tolerant of ideas that ran counter
to the views of administrators, alumni, and benefactors. They were well
263. Seligman, Theory of Progressive Taxation, supra note 155, at 222.
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aware that the "socialistic" tag often blinded people to the logic and
reasoning behind plausible reforms. This tension between academic free-
dom and the confining political climate of the times was heightened when
the public finance economists were considering the need for progressive
taxation. Just when Adams's brush with the Cornell alumni seemed to be
receding into the past, other academic economists were coming under
increased scrutiny by the administrators and the alumni of their institu-
tions. Ely, who by 1894 was teaching at Wisconsin, endured a public trial
of his ideas before he was eventually exonerated.267 A member of the
University of Wisconsin Board of Regents accused Ely not only of teaching
socialism and anarchism, but also of participating in local strikes and boy-
cotts. Ely recoiled at the allegations. Rather than defend his right to aca-
demic freedom, he recanted much of his radicalism, highlighting instead
the moderate and conservative tendencies of his writings.2 Within this
environment, it was incumbent upon the intellectual supporters of gradu-
ated taxes to create some distance between their ideas and the conventional
impressions of socialism.
2 69
Adams, who had firsthand experience with the limits of academic
freedom, met this charge head on when he sought to explain how moderately
progressive income taxes in fact were compatible with industrial capitalism.
Describing the socialist ideal as "a society in which government is the one
great industrial corporation," Adams claimed that it would be irrational for a
socialist to support progressive taxation. 210 "It would be logical for one who
defends the institution of private property, and who believes in the theory of
voluntary initiative in industry, to advocate progressive taxation as an
essential condition to the maintenance of those industrial relations in which
his ideal of society may be realized," wrote Adams.27' "[Blut for the socialist,
whose theory of social organization is opposed to that of voluntary
association, such an advocacy is illogical and absurd. 21 2 Progressive taxes
that reallocated fiscal burdens without radically redistributing wealth, Adams
seemed to imply, were wholly consistent with American institutions and culture.
267. FURNER, supra note 17, at 143-58.
268. For a more detailed account of Ely's trial, see 1 MERLE CURTI & VERNON CARSTENSEN,
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at 136-52.
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Socialism and American Liberalism, in PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 64 (Donald Fleming
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While there is little doubt that political pressures forced the progressive
economists to temper their reformist inclinations, it is unlikely that they ever
embraced the radically redistributive notions held by their German mentors.
The American new school economists abhorred the radical individualism
inherent in classical political economy, but many of them continued to
believe that economic progress was driven mainly by private industry rather
than state action.
It was this allegiance to the productive powers of capital that led them to
restrain their advocacy for a redistributive tax policy. Indeed, the tax theorists
were especially concerned about not disturbing what Adams referred to as the
"patrimony of the state," by which he meant the economic productivity of
private industry.273 In typical historicist fashion, Adams admitted that the
"patrimony of the State is not a thing that is fixed, but that it changes with the
ideas of political and industrial rights entertained by the people.)
274
Nevertheless, Adams made preserving economic incentives a fundamental part
of his fiscal vision. The "first fiscal axiom of the Science of Finance," Adams
declared, is that "[a] sound financial policy will not impair the patrimony of the
State." '275 Though Adams was genuinely concerned about the growing disparity
of wealth in the nation, he harbored an even greater fear that steeply
progressive tax rates would somehow jeopardize the seemingly eternal nature of
the state. As he stated, "the patrimony of the State consists in a flourishing
condition of private industries." 7 6
Other progressive public finance economists echoed Adams's comments.
They appeared to concur that progressive taxes could create the risk of
distorting economic incentives. But they were careful not to overstate the
case. Retreating on the issue of progressivity---on the need, that is, for a
graduated rate structure--could signal the death knell for the faculty theory. As
Seligman explained, the vital political tension behind the calls for an income
tax was expressed in the choice between proportional and progressive taxes,
and the resolution of this choice turned on "the fundamental question as to the
basis of taxation-the theory of benefits or the theory of ability." '277 Put simply,
the reform-minded economists believed that they could not defend the income
tax and the principle of faculty without defending the need for some level of
progressivity. Seligman did this by using a historicist perspective to combine
273. Id.
274. Id. at 6.
275. Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted).
276. Id. at5.
277. Seligman, Theory of Progressive Taxaton, supra note 155, at 224.
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traditional Anglo American thinking on taxation with marginal utility
analysis, an increasingly popular economic idea in the American academy.
As a variant of neoclassical economics, marginalism emerged as the
predominant theory in American economics at the turn of the century.
Unlike classical theory, which held that the value of an item was deter-
mined by the costs incurred to create it, marginalism demonstrated that the
value of a commodity depended upon the subjective worth, or utility, a con-
sumer placed on such a commodity. This value, in turn, depended upon
how much of the commodity the consumer already had. Thus each addi-
tional unit of a commodity, including money, was believed to be of lesser
value than the previous unit."'
The notion that the value of an item was determined at the margin of
diminishing returns was not unique to American conditions. European
thinkers, building on the classical ideas of David Ricardo, had throughout the
mid- and late nineteenth century applied new mathematical approaches to
measuring value based on the concept of diminishing returns. The British
economist Alfred Marshall helped synthesize the ideas of prior theorists, and
John Bates Clark, Seligman's colleague at Columbia, popularized and
expanded the application of marginal utility analysis in the United States.27
The application of Clark's notion of marginalism to tax policy reached
its apex, not surprisingly, through the work of Seligman. But at about the
same time, other reform-minded economists in the United States and
Britain independently were using the particular idea of the diminishing mar-
ginal utility of money to justify progressive taxes. Thomas N. Carver, a
professor of political economy at Oberlin College and later Harvard, and
F.Y. Edgeworth of Oxford, not only refined marginalist theories but also
used a version of the "minimum sacrifice" idea to support a "moderately
progressive system of taxation." By turning the utilitarian principle of "the
greatest good to the greatest number""28 on its head, Carver reasoned that "the
evils of taxation are twofold, the sacrifice to those who pay the taxes, and
the repression of the industry and enterprise which they occasion."2 '
278. Marginal Utility, ROUTLEDGE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 285-86 (Donald Rutherford
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Policymakers needed to be aware of both of these evils and balance the two
against each other when they structured a tax system. They needed to real-
ize that, on the one hand, an equality of sacrifice among individuals meant
that each taxpayer would pay a proportional yet varying amount of taxes,
insuring that the proper work incentives remained intact. At the same
time, a minimum amount of total aggregate sacrifice suggested that the
wealthy should pay more taxes because they received less utility from their
last, or marginal, dollar. In Carver's words: "The minimum amount of
repression is secured by imposing an equal sacrifice on all members of the
community, but the minimum amount of sacrifice is secured by collecting the
whole tax from those few incomes which have the lowest final utility.""2 '
Though he agreed with Carver's theoretical conclusions, Seligman was
much more pessimistic about the practical application of progressivity given
some of the administrative obstacles the concept faced in the United
States. Seligman wholeheartedly agreed that "progressive taxation is to a
certain extent defensible as an ideal, and as the expression of the theoretical
demand for the shaping of taxes to the test of individual faculty.""2 3 Still, he
conceded, "it is a matter of considerable difficulty to decide how far or in what
manner the principle ought to be actually carried out in practice.
''8
In terms of pure economic theory, Seligman confidently believed that
marginalism explained why progressive taxes were neither a defense of status
quo inequalities nor a form of socialist confiscation. Progressivity, seen
from the perspective of marginalism, was the theoretical crystallization of
faculty theory. In reconciling marginalism with the faculty principle,
Seligman explained that "[tihe elements of faculty [were] two-fold: (1)
those connected with acquisition or production, [and] (2) those connected
with outlay or consumption. 28. On the production side, it seemed rather self-
evident that one with a large fortune or income had "a decided advantage
in augmenting his possessions."286 In this case, "faculty may be said to increase
faster than fortune or income," suggesting the need for something "more than
[a] proportional rate of taxation. 2 7
The analysis from the consumption perspective was a bit more compli-
cated. Here, the faculty theory rested on a version of equal sacrifice, which
282. Id. at 97; F.Y. Edgeworth, The Pure Theory of Taxation, 28 ECONI. 550, 550 (1897).
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itself was based on the notion of diminishing marginal utility. Building on the
work of European theorists who refined marginal utility analysis, Seligman
illustrated how the individual benefits received from the consumption of
different items dictated the need for a progressive system of taxation:
Since the intensity of our wants and therefore their final utility
decreases as we ascend from the lower or more pressing to the higher
or less urgent wants, and since larger incomes supply the means of
satisfying these less intense wants, a strictly proportional tax would
involve smaller sacrifices in the case of the larger incomes. Strict
equality of sacrifice in the sense of relatively proportional diminution
of burden thus involves progressive taxation.2 8
In theoretical terms, the principle of faculty required progressive rather
than merely proportional taxes.
Using marginal utility analysis to defend the progressive income tax
posed some theoretical problems, however. While most economic thinkers
and perhaps even policymakers could agree that the last dollar held by the
Astors or Vanderbilts was worth much less than the last dollar held by a
common member of the working class, marginalism at its core rested on a
rather problematic interpersonal comparison of utility. Though it would
not be difficult to make the case at the extremes, it was much more chal-
lenging to differentiate the subjective utility that different citizens within
the middle class placed on their last dollar. Despite this theoretical chal-
lenge, the reform-minded economists maintained that an adherence to the
notion of faculty required a progressive rather than a proportional rate
structure. If the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility complicated
the setting of optimal rates, it did not completely undermine, at least for the
turn-of-the-century economists, the superiority of a progressive rate structure.
More practical constraints, however, tempered the progressive public
finance economists' calls for progressive income taxes. Above all else, these
economists were pragmatists. They were constantly concerned about how
tax laws and fiscal policies would operate in concrete situations and how
changes in tax law and other institutions would alter individual behavior.
Not only did the individualistic beliefs of American political culture oper-
ate as one set of impediments, but these German-trained theorists realized
that the federal government in the United States lacked the national
administrative capacity of its European counterparts. In contrasting the
progressive income tax with the general property tax, Ely, for one, claimed
288. Id. at 239.
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that both levies required an enhanced administrative apparatus, and
that an income tax would be less intrusive than the general property tax. 89
Seligman, in defending progressivity, was not so sanguine. More than
any of his colleagues, be was well aware of the administrative hurdles that a
progressive income tax needed to overcome-not the least of which was
setting the degree of progression. "Theory itself cannot determine any defi-
nite scale of progression," wrote Seligman.' 90 "And while it is highly prob-
able that the ends of justice would be more nearly subserved by some
approximation to a progressive scale, considerations of expediency as well as
the uncertainty of the interrelations between various parts of the entire tax
system should tend to render us cautious in advocating any general applica-
tion of the principle" of progressivity"9 Even when it came to defending
one of the most fundamental applications of the faculty principle, Seligman
could not abandon his faith in the importance of having tax laws and policies
comport with social and institutional contexts. "It remains to investigate as to
how far the principle" of progressivity "is applicable to the conditions
surrounding us in America to-day," wrote Seligman in 1894.292 "But, in last
resort, the crucial point is the state of the social consciousness and the
development of the feeling of civic obligation."'2 93 Ultimately, for Seligman,
economic theory could not trump historical content.
D. The Progressive Economists and the Making of the American
Income Tax
While the progressive public finance economists may have agreed that,
as Seligman noted, "the state of social consciousness" would dictate
whether American society would be receptive toward progressive income
taxes, this did not mean that the economists themselves had no role to play
in shaping "social consciousness" and in developing "the feeling of civic
obligation."' Indeed, it was during pivotal moments of social change that
reform was in fact possible. "It is always on the borderline of the transition
from the old social necessity to the new social convenience that the ethical
reformer makes his influence felt," wrote Seligman,9 "Unless the social
289. ELY, supra note 75, at 290-91.
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conditions ... are ripe for the change, the demand of the ethical reformer
will be fruitless." 96  As we have seen, reform of state and local taxation
became possible in the early years of the twentieth century mainly because
social dissatisfaction with the property tax and the need for increased state
government revenue combined with the ideas posited by the academic
economists to separate the sources of state and local tax revenue.97
Similarly, at the national level, the progressive economists were able
to advance their vision of a new fiscal state only when social conditions
were ripe. Thus, while Ely, Adams, and Seligman had been writing and lec-
turing for decades about the need for taxes based on the notion of ability, it
was not until the tumultuous process of ratifying the Sixteenth Amendment
to the Constitution-between 1909 and 1913-that they were able to see
their ideas come to fruition at the federal level. By then, of course,
Seligman had become the dominant academic voice calling for a moder-
ately progressive income tax based on the notion of faculty. As the legal
historian Herbert Hovenkamp has demonstrated, Seligman had a profound
influence on judicial policymaking throughout the first half of the twenti-
eth century. 298 But the professor had an equally important, even more direct
role during the institutional establishment of the American income tax system.
Even before 1909, when the Sixteenth Amendment was first intro-
duced, Seligman in particular spoke up in support of a national income tax. Like
many other tax experts, he believed that Pollock, the Supreme Court case
striking down the 1894 federal income tax, was wrongly decided.299
Seligman played a small, behind-the-scenes part in advising each of the par-
ties to that case. Clarence Seward, one of the attorneys representing the
taxpayers who opposed the law, requested Seligman's assistance in deter-
mining the original intent behind the Constitution's direct tax clause."°
296. Id.
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Seligman explained how his historical research and his legal analysis verified
that an income tax was, in fact, constitutional. Although he was not an
originalist, Seligman believed that during the colonial period and throughout
the drafting of the Constitution there was no clear legal meaning attached to
direct or indirect taxes. 3 '  This was probably not what Seward and his
colleagues were hoping to learn from the professor, and they conveniently
ignored his counsel." By contrast, Seligman concurred with the government
lawyers that a string of previous Court decisions had already analyzed the
direct tax clause,0 3 holding that it applied only to land and poll taxes, not to
income taxes.04 Like the government lawyers, Seligman did not expect the
Court to strike down the 1894 income tax law. When it did, a surprised
Seligman turned his energies towards supporting a constitutional amendment
that would overturn Pollock.
Even before the decision was handed down, Seligman published an article
in the popular journal Forum, taking on the principal objections to the 1894
law. 5 In a previous issue of that journal, David Wells had recycled his earlier
opposition to progressive income taxes." 6 Wells claimed that graduated rates
were a form of discrimination contrary to the notion of "uniformity" embodied
in the Fifth Amendment. 7 Responding directly to Wells, Seligman main-
tained that the constitutional restriction on uniformity applied not to the
classification of a tax but to its geographical application. "Uniform throughout
the United States," wrote Seligman, meant that "the same rate of taxation
should be imposed on all the States."3" Because Seligman did not think that
301. In his treatise on the income tax, Seligman wrote that "there was no agreement at all
as to the use or meaning of the newer term 'direct tax' during the period leading up to the
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objections to the law based on the Constitution's "direct tax clause"
merited serious consideration, he casually confirmed that the settled legal
precedents and the economic analysis meant that any attempt "to declare
the income tax unconstitutional" as a violation of the Constitution's direct
tax clause was "foredoomed to failure. '""w Seligman must have been aghast
when he learned that the Court struck down the 1894 tax law precisely
along these lines.
Nearly fifteen years later, when Congress introduced the Sixteen
Amendment, Seligman wasted no time in declaring his support for it. This
time he not only published an article in support of the amendment, he also
testified before the New York State Legislature during the ratification proc-
ess. At his first appearance before the legislature in 1910, Seligman
attempted to defuse the highly critical comments leveled by Governor
Charles Evan Hughes, an old friend and law school classmate. 1 In an ear-
lier message before the legislature, Hughes had objected to the amend-
ment's language empowering Congress "to lay and collect taxes on income
from whatever source derived." ' Hughes, like many others, believed that
the phrase "from whatever source derived" gave Congress the power to
destroy the fiscal powers and the political sovereignty of the individual
states by taxing their debt obligations.312 Seligman disagreed. He joined
others, including prominent Republican politicians such as Elihu Root, the
U.S. Senator from New York,"' in attempting to assure New York lawmak-
ers and other state officials throughout the country that the amendment
was not designed to allow the federal government to supersede the fiscal
power of states and localities. 1
Despite these assurances, the amendment could not survive the initial
resistance of the Republican majority in the New York Assembly. The
resolution was put to a vote in the Assembly three times during the 1910
session, and all three times the Republican majority resoundingly defeated
it. Because New York was a pivotal state in the ratification process-
mainly because it was the most influential of the wealthy Northeast states
309. SELIGMAN, supra note 299.
310. Letter from Charles Evans Hughes to Edwin R.A. Seligman (Apr. 4, 1904) (on file
with Butler Library, Columbia University).
311. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
312. In his speech, Hughes proclaimed that placing "the borrowing capacity of the State and
of its governmental agencies at the mercy of the Federal taxing power would be an impairment of
the essential rights of the State which, as its officers, we are bound to defend." BUENKER, supra
note 3, at 255.
313. Root on Income; Senator Upholds Levy in Letter to Albany Solons, WASH. PoST, Mar. 1, 1910.
314. BUENKER, supra note 3, at 278-80.
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hostile to reallocating tax burdens-income tax supporters realized that
they would have to get New York's approval if they expected other states to
ratify the amendment."5 This appeared to be a historical moment. Accord-
ing to Seligman and many other income tax advocates, New York lawmakers
appeared oblivious to the ripening of social consciousness and public
support for the amendment. As an ethical reformer operating at the threshold
between the "old social necessity" and the "new social convenience," '16
Seligman set out to neutralize the opposition to the income tax amendment.
Soon after the resolution was rejected by the New York Assembly in
1910, Seligman reaffirmed his views with an article directly supporting the
amendment. Writing in the pages of the Political Science Quarterly, Seligman
used his historicism to scrutinize the opposition's general reliance on original
intent, and to dissect Hughes's specific hostility to the amendment. "The
conditions which existed when the constitution was framed are no longer
existent," Seligman wrote.3 7 "During the last century... the development of
the underlying economic and social forces has created a nation, and this
development calls for uniform national regulation of many matters which
were not dreamed of by the founders.31 With Hughes's comments no doubt
in mind, Seligman concluded that economic and legal progress should not be
hindered by antiquated attachments to the ideas of state and local self-
governance. "Let us not make a fetich of 'self-government,"' Seligman
argued, "and let us not oppose central authority in those cases where self-
government means retrogression rather than progress. ' 3 9
It is difficult to gauge precisely the influence of Seligman's comments;
nonetheless, he was convinced by 1910 that a vast majority of the
American people supported a national income tax. He was, in fact, quite
prescient. For when the political winds changed direction the following
year, delivering the New York legislature to the Democrats, the income tax
amendment received new and considerably greater attention. Although
Governor Hughes had by then become a member of the U.S. Supreme
Court, his dire warnings continued to resonate among state lawmakers
across the country. Seligman appeared once again before the New York
Senate; this time he explicitly rejected Hughes's arguments against the
amendment and reminded Republican legislators of the significance of the
315. Id.
316. Seligman, supra note 222, at 131.
317. Edwin R.A. Seligman, The Income Tax Amendment, 25 PO. SCL. Q. 193, 213-14 (1910).
318. Id. at 214.
319. Id.
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1911 elections and his earlier comments.20  "It was my good fortune,"
Seligman stated in his 1911 testimony, "to say to the Senate committee
that though I was as good a Republican as any of those present, I believed
the party would be snowed under at the polls, if it refused to accept the
amendment. The Republican Party was snowed under and one of the rea-
sons was its failure to observe my warning.
321
Seligman's rebuke of Hughes's earlier warning was no less blunt.
Essentially, Seligman reiterated that Hughes and his ilk did not realize that:
(1) the proposed amendment would simply restore the constitutional status
quo pre-Pollock; (2) a tax on the interest from state bonds would not, in a
relative sense, harm the fiscal fortunes of state governments; (3) even if the
federal government limited the fiscal powers of states and localities, the
increased revenue of an income tax would benefit all, not just the federal
government; and (4) the political will of the people, representing the spirit
of the age, was behind the amendment.322
Seligman peppered his second argument, the economic analysis, with a
personal attack on Hughes. He explained that an income tax that taxed
the interest from all bonds at equal rates would not harm the market for
such securities. "When you have precisely equal taxes on all forms of prop-
erty of income," explained Seligman, "you don't affect the value of them at
all. 323 Emphasizing the illogic of Hughes economic comments, Seligman
concluded: "If any of my students at Columbia had made the same mistake
as Governor Hughes, I should have flunked him dead." '324 In rebuffing
Hughes's earlier message, Seligman was able to help galvanize the pro-
income tax forces by lending them the prestige and prominence of a well-
known expert in the field-an expert who was not afraid to tell lawmakers
or even a former Governor what he believed. Seligman's position against
his old friend Hughes seemed to be vindicated several years later in the 1915
Supreme Court decision of Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,325 when a
320. Corrects Hughes on Income Tax, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1911, at 12; Says Hughes Made
Mistake, WASH. POST, May 21, 1911, at 13; BUENKER, supra note 3, at 286-88.
321. BUENKER, supra note 3, at 288. During that same testimony, a Republican member of
the Judiciary Committee attempted to impeach Seligman's expertise in taxation. Holding up a
public finance text, he asked the professor whether he had read the whole book through. The
question caused a great deal of amusement among the onlookers, and some embarrassment for the
legislator, when he realized that he was holding up one of Seligman's own treatises. Corrects
Hughes on Income Tax, supra note 320, at 12.
322. SELIGMAN, supra note 174, at 595-610.
323. Says Hughes Made Mistake, supra note 320, at 13.
324. Corrects Hughes on Income Tax, supra note 320; Says Hughes Made Mistake, supra note 320.
325. 240 U.S. 1 (1924).
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then Justice Hughes assented to a unanimous decision that essentially refuted
his earlier position on the general power of the Sixteenth Amendment.
E. An Enduring Legacy of Tax Reform
If Seligman's role in the ratification process was the most conspicuous
example of the influence of progressive economic ideas on the making of
tax law and policy, he and his like-minded educators left a lasting legacy of
reform in other, less obvious ways. For it was in their role as teachers that
the progressive economists had perhaps their greatest impact on the devel-
opment of American public finance. As instructors and writers, they
helped mold the next generation of scholars and policymakers. Disciples
and students like Thomas S. Adams and Robert Haig became tax experts in
their own rights.
T.S. Adams was one of Ely's first external hires when he arrived in
Madison, and he soon became a coauthor for Ely's popular textbook. 26 As
many modem tax scholars have recognized, Adams became an influential
scholar and policymaker both at the state and national level during the early
development of the American income tax. He was a member of the Wisconsin
Tax Commission when it administered the first effective, modem state income
tax in 1911 327 After his time in Madison, Adams went on to work as an
economic advisor to the U.S. Treasury Department during World War I, where
he helped supervise the administration and effectiveness of controversial
measures such as the excess profits tax. Toward the end of the war and
thereafter, he also played a crucial role in developing the American position on
international taxation. 9
Robert Haig, Seligman's most successful student, also carried his men-
tor's historicist message to subsequent discussions about tax policy. After
completing a dissertation under Seligman's supervision on the history of the
326. RICHARD T. ELY ET AL., OUTLINES OF ECONOMICS (3d 1916).
327. See generally W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, PROGRESSIVISM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE
WISCONSIN INCOME TAX, 1911-1929 (1974); Mehrotra, supra note 12, at 265-335.
328. See generally W. Elliot Brownlee, Economists and the Formation of the Modern Tax System
in the U.S.: The World War I Crisis, in THE STATE AND ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE: THE AMERICAN
AND BRITISH EXPERIENCES, supra note 13, at 403; W. Elliot Brownlee, Social Investigation and
Political Learning in the Financing of World War 1, in THE STATE AND SOCIAL INVESTIGATION IN
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 323 (Michael J. Lacey & Mary 0. Fumer eds., 1993).
329. See generally Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S.
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1027 (1997); Thomas Earl Geu, Professor T.S. Adams
(1873-1933) on Federal Taxation: Dija Vu All Over Again, 10 AKRON TAX J. 29 (1993).
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Illinois property tax,"' Haig remained in nearly constant contact with his
old teacher, conducting empirical field research for him on the property tax
in Canada and the British excess profits tax of World War V Toward the
end of Seligman's career, Haig eventually joined him as a colleague at
Columbia. But Haig's greatest intellectual debt to Seligman was most visible
in Haig's early attempts to define the concept of income. In his enormously
influential 1921 essay, The Concept of Income, Haig not only credited Ely,
Seligman, and others for providing the intellectual foundation to address
the challenging issue of defining taxable income, he also reminded his
readers that this definition was historically contingent. 332 Haig modestly
suggested that what would become his pathbreaking definition of income
was, in fact, a refinement of earlier theories. Haig defined income as "the
money value of the net accretion to one's economic power between two
points of time," and he declared that "it will be readily agreed that this
definition.. . constitutes then the closest practicable approximation of true
income." '3 But lest one believe that Haig had forgotten the historicism of
his mentor, he poignantly added that "[tihe concept of taxable income is a
living, mutable concept which has varied widely from time to time and
from country to country with the conditions under which it has had to
operate." '334 Seligman could not have put it better himself.
Haig and T.S. Adams were just two of the more prominent examples of
how the social and economic theories supporting the income tax flowed to
the next generation of thinkers. To be sure, there were numerous other
reformers who acknowledged the intellectual debt that they owed to this first
generation of progressive American public finance economists."' Ultimately,
though, the progressive economists, through the sociology of knowledge, left
an enduring legacy not only with the practical tax reforms they were able to
330. ROBERT M. HAIG, A HISTORY OF THE GENERAL PROPERTY TAX IN ILLINOIS (Univ. of
Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, 1914).
331. See, e.g., Letters from Robert Haig to Edwin R.A. Seligman (Aug. 1, 1917; Aug. 17,
1917; Sept. 6, 1917; July 22, 1919; July 30, 1919; Sept. 6, 1937) (copies on file with author).
332. Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 1-28 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921).
333. Id. at 7.
334. Id. at 27.
335. Isaac Rubinow, the foremost expert on social insurance in the early twentieth century
and an early proponent of social security, for instance, learned about German compulsory worker's
insurance from Seligman. RODGERS, supra note 13, at 242-43. On the pivotal role of progressive
economists in enacting social insurance programs during this period, see generally DAVID A. MOSS,
SOCIALIZING SECURITY: PROGRESSIVE-ERA ECONOMISTS AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
SOCIAL POLICY (1996).
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achieve, but perhaps more importantly through their contributions to
that most fluid yet significant sector of society-the realm of ideas.
CONCLUSION
By the 1920s, the paradigm shift in tax theory initiated by the progres-
sive public finance economists began to crystallize. Toward the end of the
First World War, Seligman himself could proudly proclaim that in justifying a
tax, as opposed to a toll or special assessment, "the criterion is always ability
,,136to pay. Over time, subsequent generations of tax theorists echoed this
claim, as the American system of public finance became increasingly reliant
on the income tax. Indeed, by the 1950s, not only did the income tax appear
to be entrenched as the principal source of federal government revenue,3 7 but
the notion of ability to pay had become axiomatic among many tax scholars.
Some mistakenly presumed that its "universal acceptance" stretched back
well before the turn of the century." 8 Although some legal scholars more
recently have come to question the substantive content of the notion of
ability to pay," 9 as well as the use of income as the proper tax base,"4 even
these present day theorists resolutely adhere-often implicitly-to the
notion of tax-paying ability as a compelling, albeit indeterminate, 141 guide
for policymaking.
336. See Seligman et al., supra note 163, at 43. Despite conceding that the benefits principle
could still explain the need for fees and special assessments, Seligman boldly proclaimed that the
ability-to-pay theory had vanquished the benefits principle when it came to tax policy discussions.
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made by economists and lawyers alike between special assessments and taxes," wrote Seligman. Id.
"And nothing is more firmly established than the substitution of the ability theory for the old benefit
theory in taxation." Id.
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The seemingly self-evident nature of the principle of ability to pay is a
current result of the theoretical )shift that fostered the turn-of-the-century
structural transformation in American public finance. This transformation
was brought about by a combination of material and idealistic forces. For it was
a fusion of the functional need for increased government revenue, together
with the desire for creating a fairer and more transparent system of taxation,
that eventually led to the intellectual ascendancy of the American income
tax. Indeed, throughout their efforts and achievements, the reform-minded
public finance economists were concerned mainly about the equitable
distribution of tax burdens, with what they referred to as rounding "out the
existing tax system in the direction of greater justice." '342 Through their
scholarship, teaching, and public lectures, these Progressive-Era economists
guided a paradigm shift in the theories that undergirded American taxation-
a paradigm shift away from benefits theory toward the principle of ability to pay.
In so doing, these economists helped to inject a sense of redistributional
reasoning into the prevailing fiscal order. Though they did not go as far in
advancing radically redistributive progressive taxes as some of their German
mentors, or even other American reformers, they did bring a vigorous defense
of justice and equity to an otherwise anemic American dialogue about
taxation. In their unyielding support for tax reform, they demonstrated that
contemporary political, social, and economic conditions dictated that the
American system of fiscal governance required a permanent progressive
income tax. In this way, these political economists became the visionaries
and architects of the modem American fiscal state-they drew the blueprints
for a new, more equitable fiscal polity.
By guiding the theoretical shift in tax policy, these fiscal architects
provided the intellectual foundation upon which others could build. And build
they did. Government administrators and the social movements for tax reform,
each in their own way, engaged the theories of academic political economists
as they supplied the institutional and social support for the emerging fiscal
polity. Subsequent events and conditions throughout the twentieth century
hastened this process. The First World War, for example, occasioned the rise
of national administrative capacities that insured the longevity of the new fiscal
state. And as early as the start of the 1920s, at the conclusion of the Great
War, the income tax came to dominate federal revenues.343
342. Seligman, supra note 220, at 610.
343. By 1923, well over 60 percent of federal government receipts came from income taxes.
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE U.S., supra note 1, at 1106-08.
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Though the reach of the income tax laws was scaled back during the
general retrenchment of the interwar period, the larger trend towards direct
and progressive taxation was accelerated in response to the national emer-
gencies of the Great Depression and the Second World War)44 The exigen-
cies of World War II, in particular, provided the impetus for transforming
the income tax, through the process of withholding, from a "class tax" to a
"mass tax." These tax reforms, to be sure, were crucial to the consolidation
of the new fiscal order. But the roots of these subsequent changes could be
traced back to the turn-of-the-century transformation in public finance, for
it was then that the ideas and theories of the Progressive-Era economists
combined with a particular set of material conditions to establish the intel-
lectual and institutional foundations of the modem American fiscal state.
Recounting the intellectual history of the American income tax is not
a story of mere antiquarian interest. Rather, at a time when national dis-
cussions about fundamental tax reform appear to echo the past, and when
our current hybrid income tax system seems to be in some peril, the ideas
and historical circumstances that gave shape to the initial creation of this
system are highly relevant to the present. By investigating how and why
the notion of faculty or ability to pay came to dominate the justifications
for a progressive income tax, this Article has attempted to illuminate the
ideas and events which, over time, have combined to create the intellectual
and institutional parameters within which current tax laws and policies are
made. In this sense, this historical study does not contain an explicit nor-
mative lesson for current scholars and lawmakers, nor is it an attempt to recap-
ture the timeless origins of the modem American income tax. Instead, the
more subtle aim has been to unearth the implicit historical forces that have
shaped the institutional limits and possibilities that confront present-day
policymakers. Some factors emerged in the recent past, such as the leveling
of exemptions and the use of withholding. Others are more remote.
Together these factors are crucial for understanding contemporary issues.
This story about the intellectual construction of the American income tax,
moreover, holds some humbling lessons for scholars, reformers, and policymakers
in our own time. For those historically minded scholars who have bemoaned the
failure of the U.S. income tax to radically redistribute wealth,34 the efforts of Ely,
Adams, Seligman, and others to reform the nineteenth-century system of
344. On the World War ii transformation, see generally BROWNLEE, supra note 4, at 89-
100; DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND
WAR 1929-1945, at 623-26 (1999); see also Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of
Propaganda in the Expansion of the Income Tax during World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685 (1989).
345. STANLEY, supra note 9; KOLKO, supra note 9; WEINSTEIN, supra note 9.
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indirect taxes should be seen as a modest reminder of what was accomplished
by the establishment of the income tax. While redistributing wealth in a
dramatic way, through a combination of steeply progressive rates and
government transfer payments, was not the principal aim of the turn-of-the-
century theorists, their ideas and actions did have an enduring impact on
reallocating the fiscal burdens of financing a modem nation-state.
Similarly, for those current tax theorists who have attempted to revive the
benefits principle,"' the intellectual debate that framed the creation of the
American income tax may prompt some reconsideration about the political
implications of the benefits theory. The progressive economists, with their
historicist leanings, would have been loath to suggest that either the benefits or
faculty principles-or for that matter, the income tax itself-were timeless,
transhistorical touchstones for tax policy. Ely, Adams, and Seligman might
be surprised, however, by the current use of the benefits principle to support
the prevailing tax system. For in explicating the larger social and political
theories that undergirded the contending principles of taxation at the turn of
the twentieth century, these economists sought to reveal how the benefits
doctrine contained within it a rather narrow and limiting view of modem
citizenship--a view that may ultimately belie the normative goals of current
tax scholars who see in the benefits principle a potential bulwark for current
tax policies. Although a limited return to the benefits theory may be useful in
retaining the current corporate income tax, 47 a wholesale acceptance of the
quid pro quo notion underlying the benefits principle would surely restrict the
scope of the modem regulatory, administrative, and welfare state.
To be sure, much has changed since the Progressive-Era economists
mounted their assault on the old fiscal order. Given the twenty-first century
concerns about security, especially in a post-9/1 world, the benefits of
protection provided by the state have taken on a new valence that may justify
a reexamination of the theories underpinning the benefits principle. Still, for
Ely, Adams, and Seligman, the intellectual project of advancing the faculty
theory was based on restructuring the American system of public finance-on
transferring the fiscal obligations of financing a modem state onto those with
the greatest tax-paying ability. In the process, these reform-minded academics
were also attempting an even more fundamental transformation. Operating
within the institutional constraints of American political culture, these
theorists were seeking to alter the meaning of modem citizenship as they
attempted to redefine the relations between state, society, and economy.
346. See supra note 25.
347. Id.
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